Essays on the production of human capital by Sørensen, Erik Ø.
Essays on the production of human capital
Erik ø. Sørensen-
Bergen, November 2005.
Dissertation submitted to the Department of Economics, Norwegian School
of Economics and Business Administration, in partial fulfilment of the re-
quirements for the degree of dr. oecon.
O~~OOOOZ'2_
3((a_S5Lf. sY
00Cae__
~.2-
Acknowledgments 5
Introduction: Human Capital 7
Errata to paper 1 15
Paper 1: The neighbourhood is not what it used to be 19
Paper 2: The impact of a primary school reform on educational strat- 43
ification
Paper 3: Sectoral Choice with Human Capital and Accumulation of 71
Pension Benefits
3
4
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the Department of Economics at the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration for financial and moral support for
this project, and to the Department of Economics at Queen's University for
hosting me one year as a visiting research student. At both depertments I
have had more stimulating and helpful discussions with too many people to
mention by name.
My advisory comittee, Kjell G. Salvanes, Christopher Ferrall and Gerard
van den Berg, has been extremely helpful and encouraging. Working with
Kjell G. Salvanes and Oddbjørn Raaum on our common papers has also been
an important learning experience.
Tor Jakob Klette was on my advisory comittee before he so untimely left
us. This thesis is dedicated to his memory.
5
6
Introduction: Human Capital
That education is important for skills and human welfare is an idea that has
grown into mainstream common knowledge. As recently as 1901, however,
when B. Seebohm Rowntree published the first edition of his magisterial
survey of the working classes in York, Poverty: A Study of Town Life, he did
not mention education. At that time, however, education could not any more
be ignored. An act of government had made access to elementary education
free for all in 1891, and when Rowntree published a second edition the next
year, a 'supplementary chapter' addressed some additional topics that needed
attention: Among them were "public houses and Clubs", education and old
age pensions (pp 362-445, Rowntree, 1902).
While undoubtedly the roots of modern human capital theory can be
found in the writings of Adam Smith, St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle,
those of us lacking scholarly training depend on more recent contributions.
We know, however, that the basics of human capital theory was known to
Anders Nicolai Kiær, director of Statistics Norway in the period 1877-1913,
when he gave a lecture on "the economic value of a human life" to the
Norwegian Association of Economists. Drawing on German authorities, Kiær
noted that the value of a life could be calculated both from stream of costs
associated with bringing children up to productive age and from the income
above subsistence which flowed as a result of such investments. l He presented
Table 1 which shows the an average life-cycle income profile for working class
men and women, calculated the monetary costs of educational improvements,
and noted how the increased income stream that would followwould have to
be balanced against the monetary costs of education and foregone earnings.
He suggested following a (German) dr. Engle in using a 4% discount rate -
but shied away from the final calculation of the net present value of education
since he regarded the statistical data at his disposal as too ridden with errors.
Kiær envisioned calculating the value of human capital from something
very much like a national accounting perspective, assuming a rate of dis-
lKiær briefly noted the possibility of using life insurance values, but did not pursue
this strategy.
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aarlig aarlig balance. Ilrlig aarlig balance.
udgift. indlægl udgif\. indtaegt
0-6 116 116 116 -116
6-10 174 174 174 -174
10-14 232 33 199 232 33 -199
14-20 319 330 I1 290 330 +40
20-25 406 577,5 171,5 319 396 +77
26-60 464 660 196 348 396 +48
60-70 348 330 18 290 264 -26
70 og derover 290 66 224 261 49,S -211,5
Table 1: Cost- and income streams for men and women. The first
column is age, the second to fourth column are expenses, income and "net
surplus" for men, the fifth to seventh columns repeat this information for
women. Table 2 in Kiær (1891). Kiær made the calculations according to
the method of a dr. Becker.
counting with little regard for how individuals themselves solved their choice
problems. Alfred Marshall, however, has a an individualistic terminology
and grasp on the problem that is very modern:
... the investment of capital in the rearing and early training
of the workers of England is limited by the resources of parents
in the various grades of society, by their power of forecasting the
future, and by their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the sake
of their children .
. . .The professional classes especially, while generallyeager to
save some capital for their children, are even more on the alert for
opportunities of investing it in them. And whenever there occurs
in the upper grades of industry a newopening for which an extra
and special education is required, the future gains need not be
very high relatively to the present outlay, in order to secure a
keen competition for the post.
But in the lower ranks of society the evil is great. For the
slender means and education of the parents, and the comparative
weakness of their power of distinctly realizing the future, prevent
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them from investing capital in the education and training of their
children with the same free and bold enterprise with which cap-
ital is applied to improving the machinery of any well-managed
factory (p. 467, Marshall, 1920).
Marshall continues his discussion of the problem of underinvestment in
human capital among the "lower ranks of society". He has earlier mentioned
how the problem arises because the worker "remains his own property" and
cannot be held as security, giving rise to financial constraints among the lower
ranks and cumulative effects through the generations. When John R. Hicks
wrote a new standard reference on economics in 1939, the notion of human
capital was not something which needed special discussion. "Human capital"
is noted in the index, and is introduced in passing in the text: "... increment
or decrement in the value of prospects due to changes in people's own earning
power (accumulation or decumulation of 'Human Capital'), ... " (p. 178,
Hicks, 1939). Hicks introduced the terms in a discussion about the problems
of defining income under aggregate uncertainty, but he certainly does not
seem to find "human capital" a new or particularly interesting idea.
Mincer (1958) and Becker (1964) are generally regarded as the ones re-
sponsible for the transfer of human capital theory into the post-WWII new
and more mathematical economic science. They brought the formal tools
of investment analysis to bear on individual educational choice, and from
now on there is a recognisable and modern labour economics field with all
the idealisations and stylised models that we have gotten used to. Recently,
sequential models of schooling and career choices in environments with un-
certainty have become feasible (Keane and Wolpin, 1997).
The question Marshall raised about financial constraints and intergener-
ational transmissions of inequality, however, remained strongly on the minds
of empirical researchers. Lee Soltow, a professor of Economics at Ohio State
University, came to Norway to examine the historical development of inequal-
ity. In 1965 he published Toward Income Equality in Norway, in which he
proposed a methodology and a tradition of empirical inquiry that laid the
groundwork for much of current research. Soltow introduced use of massive
administrative databases in empirical labour economics. He examined 120
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Figure 1: Income inequality in eight Norwegian cities 1840-1960.
Data are taken from exhibit 8 in Soltow (1965).
years of tax registers in 8 Norwegian cities. He sampled income data from
these registers and calculated Cini-inequality indices for for the years 1840-
1960. His main results, summarised in Figure 1, show a downward trend in
urban inequality over this period.
Soltow discusses various structural changes to the Norwegian economy
that can help explain this trend: changes in manufacturing, patterns of trade
and socio-political changes. Of particular interest to labour economists is his
discussion of education. He notes that greatly increased access to education
probably helped reduce general inequality. But he also provides a specific
analysis of the role of education in intergenerational processes. In Sarpsborg,
one of the cities he studied, he was able to link people across time periods, and
he got access to school records that included the name and address of parents.
This very early use of linked administrative data helped him to establish an
empirical relation between how well students do in school with their adult
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Figure 2: Test scores and adult income in Sarpsborg. This Figure is
exhibit 62 in Soltow (1965). Test score is from the end of 7th grade in 1930
while income is taken from the tax registers of the same people 1960.
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Son's median test score
Father's income (y) 1930 1960
y < P20
P20 ::; Y < P40
P40 ::; Y < P60
P60 ::; Y < PSO
PSO ::; Y
2.75
2.88
3.25
2.75
3.25
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
Table 2: Fathers income and son's median test score. Income measured
in percentiles. Taken from Exhibit 61 in Soltow (1965).
earnings 30 years later, (Figure 2). This is not particularly surprising, but
combined with information on how the relation between parental income and
childrens educational outcomes has grown weaker (Table 2), he could provide
a story in which changes in the workings of schools increase intergenerational
mobility.
The work of Soltow, though today mostly forgotten, was an early attempt
to make systematic use oflinked administrative databases that were construc-
ted for non-research purposes. This thesis adopts this strategy. I have been
very fortunate to work with professor Kjell G. Salvanes on constructing a
database of linked administrative records and census data at the Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration. This work is made pos-
sible by an unique personal identifier given to each person, a process started
in 1961-62 using the 1960 census (Skaug, 1968). We are therefore able to
work with the full resident population instead of painstakingly constructing
datasets from paper records such as Soltow was forced to do.
The three papers that make up this thesis take different approaches to the
production of human capital. The first two, Raaum, Salvanes and Sørensen
(2003, 2006), are in the tradition of Soltow, both in the use of data and in
the reduced form approach. We study how family, local neighbourhoods and
schools might have influenced adult earnings and educational outcomes. We
find a small and declining role for the social environment (neighbourhoods
and schools), but an important role for the family. These papers therefore
indirectly support the methodological individualism adopted in the third pa-
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per on life-cycle career choices. This third paper adopts the full investment
metaphor that Keane and Wolpin (1997) and related papers have taken from
Becker and Mincer. My paper differs from Keane and Wolpin (1997) in mod-
elling education as an input in an uncertain production of skills rather than
taking education as a direct determinant of wages. This makes it possible
to allow for sector-specific skills and for stochastic depreciation of skills that
are not used.
The following sub-sections briefly characterise the papers of the thesis.
"The Neighbourhood is not what it used to be"
Co-authored with Oddbjørn Raaum and Kjell G. Salvanes. Forthcoming in
The Economic Joumal.
Using a variance decomposition framework that bounds the effect of fam-
ilies and neighbourhoods, we find important effects of family characteristics
and residentiallocation on adult education and earnings in Norway. Neigh-
bourhoods are less important than families, as the correlations among siblings
are significantly higher than among children growing up in the same local
community. The impact of neighbourhoods is reduced by half from 1960
to 1970. We link this result to several policy changes in the 1960s aimed
at increasing equality of opportunity in Norway. Neighbour correlations in
Norway are found to be significantly lower than in the United States.
"The Impact of a Primary School Reform on Educa-
tional Stratification: A Norwegian Study of Neighbour
and School Mate Correlations"
Co-authored with Oddbjørn Raaum and Kjell G. Salvanes. Published in
Swedish Economic Policy Review.
School quality is hard to define and measure. It is influenced by not
only school expenditures, but also characteristics that are hard to measure
like norms and peer effects among teachers and pupils. Furthermore, family
background and community characteristics are important in explaining edu-
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cational outcomes. In this paper we study the composite effect of primary
schools and neighbourhoods on adult educational attainment controlling for
family characteristics. Instead of identifying the effect of specific neighbour-
hood and school characteristics on educational attainment, we focus on cor-
relations in final years of schooling among neighbouring children and school
mates. We find a clear trend of declining influence of childhood location over
the 24 year period (birth cohorts 1947-1970). Then we ask whether a change
in the compulsory school law extending the mandatory years of education,
can explain this pattern. We find some effect of the primary school reform
on the change in the neighbourhood effect. Motivated by the fact that neigh-
bouring children typically go to the same school, we estimate school mate
correlations for children born in the 1960s. The overall impact of factors
shared by children who graduated from the same school at the age of 15/16
is negligible. The variation in "school quality" and the impact of peers on
final educational attainment seem to have been very limited in Norway.
"Sectoral Choice with Human Capital and Accumula-
tion of Pension Benefits"
Universal pension plans and large public-sector workforces affect accumula-
tion and allocation of human capital. The benefit reforms and re-training
programs being considered in many countries are likely to affect behaviour
in ways that can only be analysed within forward-looking models of lifetime
labour supply. Using Norwegian panel data on three birth cohorts, this pa-
per develops and estimate a life-cycle model of public- and private-sector
employment. The model of sequential career-choices builds on Keane and
Wolpin (1997), extending the accumulation of skills to be sector-specific and
allowing unobserved, non-deterministic depreciation of skills. The Norwegian
retirement benefits are modelled in a way that builds on the discretisation
approach of Rust and Phelan (1997), and identification is aided by exploiting
how current career-choices affect future expected benefits. I find important
heterogeneity in skill accumulation. The model is used to analyse the effect
of a pension reform on sector-specific labour supply. The reform has large
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effects on labour supply, but the sectoral effects are small.
Errata to paper 1
On page "282" of paper 1, the condition in line 4-5 should be that
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THE NEIGHBOURHOOD IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE*
Oddbjørn Raaum, Kjell G. Salvanes and Erik ø. Serensen
Using a variance decomposition framework that bounds the effect of families and neigh-
bourhoods, we find important effects of family characteristics and residentiallocation on adult
education and earnings in Norway. Neighbourhoods are less important than families, as the
correlations among siblings are significantly higher than among children growing up in the
same local community. The impact of neighbourhoods is reduced by half from 1960 to 1970.
We link this result to several policy changes in the 1960s aimed at increasing equality of
opportunity in Norway. Neighbour correlations in Norway are found to be significantly lower
than in the US.
The role of families in determining socio-economic outcomes has been exten-
sively discussed in economics as well as from other scientific perspectives. Par-
ents influence their children via several channels: investment in their children's
education, transmission of cultural values and social skills, and genetic
endowments. Most studies show a strong degree of intergenerational transmis-
sion, since parental characteristics such as income and education are highly
correlated with the outcomes of children along the same dimensions (Solon,
1999). Geographical location of the family is one specific aspect of parental
behaviour. The close link between familyand neighbourhood means that the
impact of the two ought to be studied together. Since families self-select into
neighbourhoods, resemblance in adult outcomes among childhood neighbours
may reflect family rather than neighbourhood effects. But sibling resemblance
can also be due to neighbourhood effects, since most brothers and sisters
grow up in the same community. An unique Norwegian dataset provides
the opportunity of an integrated and historical approach. We quantify the
relative effects of families and neighbourhoods and examine their stability over
time.
Neighbourhood effects is a label for a variety of different mechanisms. Some
studies have focused on social interaction in peer-groups, through attitudes and
preference formation as well as the existence and enforcement of social norms
(Durlauf, 2001). Of course, neighbourhoods can also be important because of
varying local resource bases, through availability of institutions such as schools and
childcare. The significance of childhood location depends on whether these
characteristics have any real impact and how they vary across neighbourhoods.
Peer effects are likely to be amplified via sorting of advantaged families into
advantaged neighbourhoods. The variation in local institutions such as schools
* We are grateful for comments from seminar participants at the Norwegian School of Economics
and BusinessAdministration, the University of Bergen, the University of Oslo, the University of Uppsala,
Queen's University as well as helpful referees. Financial support was provided by the Norwegian
Research Council, grant 120652/520 under the programme 'Competence, Education and Value Cre-
ation', under the 'Programme on Welfare Research', grants 140127/330 and 137236/530, and the
"Programme on Efficiency in the Public Sector", grant 125251/520.
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and nurseries may also increase when sorting intensifies, and this would tend to
reinforce peer effects.
The literature does not provide much evidence of neighbourhood effects on
adult outcomes, and we know little about whether these effects are stable over
time. The willingness of parents to paya premium on house prices in order to get
access to better schools and neighbourhood for their children shows that resi-
dential location is perceived as important (Black, 1999; Gibbons and Machin,
2003).Jargowsky (1996) finds some evidence ofincreased segregation by income
in US metropolitan areas between 1970 and 1990.1 However, the evidence sup-
porting causal effects of childhood neighbourhood characteristics on opportun-
ities or behaviour affecting adult outcomes is far from compelling, and
identification is difficult. For instance, if we think of peer group influence as one
potentially important channel of residential neighbourhood effects, it is hard to
distinguish the selection into neighbourhoods from the impact of peer group
behaviour on individual outcomes via social interaction. Most studies report
unstable and small effects of community characteristics when these are included
directly into the estimation equations of adult earnings or educational attainment
(Ginther et al., 2000). In addition to high correlation between familyand neigh-
bourhood characteristics due to sorting, it is also difficult to determine which
characteristics to include and what biases result from using an incomplete set of
characteristics.
In light of the difficulties of estimating causal effects of neighbourhood char-
acteristics and previous failed attempts to disentangle them from family effects, we
focus on the resemblance in adult earnings and educational attainment among
siblings and neighbouring children (Solon et al., 2000; Page and Solon, 2003).2 If
aspects of the family and/or residential community during childhood and adol-
escence are important determinants of adult outcomes, there will be a strong
correlation between siblings as compared to two arbitrarily chosen individuals. It is
possible to use this correlation to bound the share ofneighbourhood effects in the
total variance of outcomes.
In the present paper we focus on the effects of family background and child-
hood location on adult educational attainment and earnings. Rich data on the full
population of Norwegian citizens enable us to construct neighbourhoods and
families at the time of the 1960 and 1970 censuses, and to measure adult outcomes
in 1990-5. We address the following questions:
What proportions of the variation in adult socio-economic outcomes, such as
education and earnings, can be explained by familyand childhood neighbour-
hood characteristics?
Are families more important than neighbourhoods?
Are these relationships stable over time?
l Kremer (1997) is sceptical of suggestions that changes in residential sorting will have a large impact
on inequality in education and earnings. However, Kremer uses US census tracts as neighbourhoods,
and these tracts are quite large. This may be one reason why he finds small effects of neighbourhood
sorting.
2 See Edin et al. (2003), Katz et al. (2001) and Oreopoulos (2003) for interesting attempts to use
social experiment designs as an alternative to using data representative for a complete economy.
© Royal Economic Society 2006
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Our combined study of siblings and neighbouring children enables us to tell the
extent to which Norwegian siblings' correlations reflect childhood location rather
than common endowments or familyenvironment. By comparing our estimates
with those found in US data, we can also indicate whether these relationships are
similar in different institutional settings." Whether families and neighbourhoods
have become more or less important determinants of adult outcomes is partic-
ularly interesting in light of the economic policies in Norway during the 1960s that
aimed at increasing the equality of opportunity. Policies of the 1960s that may have
influenced the effect of neighbourhoods include school reforms, increased access
to student grants, and a radical redistribution of resources across municipalities.
The article is organised as follows. In the next Section we describe the statistical
approach used to measure the effects of familyand neighbourhood on adult
education attainment and earnings. Section 2 contains a description of data as well
as estimation procedures. The results are presented and discussed in Section 3,
and Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
1. Statistical Model
Let YCfsbe an outcome variable, such as permanent income or years of education,
for sibling s in the Jih family in neighbourhood c. We assume that we can
decompose additively the role of neighbourhood, familyand individual-specific
factors on the outcome as
Ycfs = fJ'Zc + a.'Xcj + tcj" (I)
where Xcfis a vector of all family characteristics that influence permanent earnings
or years of education, Zc contains all the neighbourhood characteristics, and tcfs
represents individual factors orthogonal to both familyand neighbourhood
effects. Since Z; and Xcfare latent vectors that include all relevant variables, it is not
a restriction to let tcfs be orthogonal to the explanatory variables. We expect the
family background effects, riXcfi and the neighbourhood effects, P'Z", to be
positively correlated. Advantaged families tend to sort into advantaged neigh-
bourhoods and children in less favourable local communities tend to have parents
with fewer resources.
We are looking for the relative influence of familyand neighbourhoods on adult
outcomes, var(a.'Xcj)/var(ycjs) and var(p'Zc)/var(ycjs)' The relative variance of the
neighbourhood effects, var(p'Zc)/var(ycjs), measures the proportion of the vari-
ation in years of education or long-term earnings that can be attributed to factors
shared by children from the same neighbourhood. Obviously, the correlation in
adult outcomes between children growing up in the same local community cannot
tell why neighbourhoods matter. They include the joint effects of variation in
3 Studies from the US seem to dominate the existing evidence of family characteristics on adult
outcomes, and especially the effect of community background has almost exclusively been studied
within the US context. However,Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) and Dearden et al. (1997) use data for
the United Kingdom to study the effect of family background. Gibbons (2002), Gibbons (2003) finds
support for neighbourhood effects on educational attainment above family effects using UK data for
1970.
© RoyalEconomic Society 2005
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neighbourhood characteristics (Zs) and the causal impact they have on adult
outcomes (P's).
If all the familyand neighbourhood factors were observable and could be
measured with accuracy, the strategy would be to estimate a regression model
based on (1). Obviously, not all variables are observable or possible to measure
with accuracy. Rather than arbitrarily choosing familyand neighbourhood factors
to include among those available, it is possible to bound the variance of neigh-
bourhood effects by measuring neighbour covariances in Ycjs and observed family
characteristics (Solon et al., 2000). The total variance of the socioeconomic out-
come can be decomposed as
var(ycjs)= var(fJ'Zc) +var(IX'Xc[) + 2COV(IX'Xc[,fJ'Zc)+var(€c!,). (2)
The covariance between neighbouring children sand s from families f and J is
COv(Ycft,Ye!,f) = var(fJ'Zc) + COV(IX/Xc!,IX/Xc[') + 2COV(IX'Xe!,/J'Ze). (3)
In (3), we notice that the neighbour covariance consists of more than the
variance in neighbourhood characteristics given in the first term. The second
term, cov(cx'XcfilX'Xq) represents sorting of similar families into the same areas,
since neighbouring children come from similar families. We will assume that this
covariance is positive. The third term, COV(IX'Xe/,P'Ze), also represents sorting, in
that it denotes the tendency of advantaged families to sort into advantaged
neighbourhoods. We will assume that this is positive as well. We see that these
two assumptions of positive sorting, together with the linear additive form of (l),
imply that var(p'Zc) ~ cov(Yeft' Yell). The empirical neighbour covariance can
therefore be interpreted as an upper bound on the variance of neighbourhood
effects.
Children from the same family share both the neighbourhood and the family
background,
COV(yC!Sl Yc[f) = var(fJ'Zc) + var(IX'Xc!)+ 2cov(«x;'fJ'Ze). (4)
With the assumptions as outlined above, the empirical sibling covariance is an
upper bound for family effects, since the covariance includes the effects of
neighbourhood characteristics such as the quality and availability of community
institutions and the characteristics of the other adults and children living in the
neighbourhood.
Access to neighbourhood identifiers and family characteristics in the same
data enables us to tighten the bounds mentioned above, both on the neigh-
bourhood effect and on the family effects. Equation (3) suggets that the upper
bound on the neighbourhood effects can be made tighter by introducing
observed family characteristics shared by neighbours. Let Xc[ denote such an
observed subset of family characteristics. Following Solon et al. (2000) and
Altonji (1988), we estimate a regression of the outcome variable on Xc[,
including a full set of neighbourhood dummy variables which will absorb the
neighbourhood effects and the neighbourhood means of unobserved family
characteristics. Let these within-neighbourhood estimates be denoted a. We
© Royal Economic Society 2006
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expect the contribution from unobserved family characteristics to be positively
correlated with our observed measure. Since we measure our family character-
istics with error, and we cannot expect to fully proxy unobservables with
observables, it seems reasonable to assume that cov(a'Xe!, ll'Xel') :S cov
(ll'Xc!, aXel')' Our preferred measure is adjusted for observed family charac-
teristics. We use the estimated neighbour covariance and subtract the covari-
ance in predicted family effects,
(5)
Our assumptions on the positive sorting then implies that this measure is a tighter
bound on the neighbourhood effects.
Even if all the relevant family characteristics were included in Xe!, and the
associated parameter estimates were unbiased, the adjusted covariance would still
be an upper bound since the covariance between the family effects and the
neighbourhood effects is not accounted for. The linear additive form of (1) is an
identifying assumption for the interpretation of the CoVadj.(Ye!" Yel'i) as an upper
bound, as it restricts the potential for interaction between familyand neighbour-
hoods.
Any upper bound on the variance of neighbourhood effects can be used to find
a corresponding lower bound on the variance of family effects. By subtracting the
adjusted neighbour covariance from the sibling correlation, what is left represents
a lower bound on the variance of the family effects. The variance of the family
effects can be written as
var( 1X'Xe!) = cov(Yifs' Ye!i) - [COV(Ye!s>Ye!'i) - cov( lX'Xc! ' lX'XcI' ) ] .
Since (5) is an upper bound on the two terms in brackets we use
CoV(Ye!" Ycfi) - CoVadj.(Yifs' Ycf'i) as a lower bound on the family effects. The lower
bound property arises from the fact that we cannot fully observe and correct for
the tendency of similar families to cluster in the same neighbourhood. The
covariance between the neighbourhood and the family effects, cov(a.'Xep P'Ze),
does not influence the interpretation, since it is included in both the neighbour
and the family covariance.
2. Data and Estimation
The database we use has been put together with sources from Statistics Norway
(Moen et al., 2003). It includes linked administrative data, which covers all people
resident in Norway. We also have the national censuses of 1960 and 1970
(Vassenden, 1987). We can link records from these datasets using an unique
personal identifier given to all Norwegian residents by the national population
register. We use a set of household and census tract identifiers in the census to
identify families and place of residence during childhood. The administrative data
provide information about taxable income (excluding capital gains) and educa-
tional attainment, while we can use a variety of family background variables from
the censuses.
© Royal Economic Society 2005
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2.1. Neighbourhoods
We use the individual's recorded census tract at the time of the census as an
identifier of neighbourhood. Byfuglien and Langen (1983) document the prin-
ciples used for delineating tract boundaries. In 1960 the main principles were that
a 'densely populated area' with an expected population of at least 200 persons
should be a separate tract, that tract boundaries should not cross parish bound-
aries, nor should they cross older administrative boundaries or boundaries that
would result from expected adjustments of municipalities. Where population
growth was expected, tracts should be planned such that adjustments of tracts in
the following census would involve only a limited number of boundary adjust-
ments. Finally, a tract should be homogeneous with respect to communications,
industry and demographical structure. These regulations were not imposed on
urban municipalities in 1960, and the size of urban tracts varies considerably in the
1960 census.
In 1970 the boundaries were redrawn to reflect changes in population density
and a large number of municipality mergers during the 1960s. In 1960 the 732
municipalities had a total number of 7,996 tracts, while in 1970 the 451 munici-
palities had 8,818 tracts. The average tract populations were 464 and 439 in 1960
and 1970 respectively. In 1960, 6,127 tracts had a population of fewer than 500
individuals. This number grew to 6,809 in 1970.4 Most of the new tracts appeared
in urban areas, reflecting both urbanisation and that the formal guidelines for
tract delineation only gradually were applied to urban areas. The tracts in Oslo, the
capital city, had an average of 4,903 inhabitants in the 1960 census; this was
reduced to 1,091 in 1970.
The Norwegian tracts were small by the international standards of the day.
Sweden had 2,568 'parishes' in 1971, with an average of 3,145 individuals, Den-
mark had about 5,000 primary units in 1970, with an average of 990 individuals.
Great Britain had 'enumeration districts' of about 750-1,000 individuals, in the
1961 census (Langen, 1975, pp. 5-6). The US Bureau of the Census requires the
average population of all census tracts in a county to be about 4,000 people, and
there were 62,276 tracts and Block Numbering Areas in the US 1990 census
(Bureau of the Census, 1994, pp. lO-I). The Norwegian census tracts are much
closer in size to the US 'Block Groups', a subdivision of census tracts and block
numbering areas.
The neighbourhood definitions used by Solon et al. (2000) are not census
subdivisions. They use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and what
makes it possible to identify neighbourhoods in the PSID is a strict hierarchical
sampling procedure. Within each Primary Sampling Unit, smaller areas were
chosen, such as 'cities, towns, census tracts etc.' (Solon et al., 2000, p. 385). At least
one 'chunk' of 20-30 contiguous dwellings was chosen from within each of these
smaller areas, a total of 6-20 chunks per PSU. Within these chunks, 4 dwelling
units were selected. From the information available, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that our neighbourhoods are somewhat larger than the neighbourhoods
4 Langen (1975), Table 4.6 and and Table 4.7.
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that can be identified from the PSID data, but smaller than the census tracts mostly
used to assess neighbourhood effects using US data."
We observe the neighbourhood children live in at one point in time. This may
not accurately represent the environment of children from families who move
around. Such measurement error will bias estimates of neighbourhood effects
downward; however, families with children tend to move to neighbourhoods that
are similar to those they leave, so we cannot conclude anything about the mag-
nitude of this effect from statistics about the frequency of moving alone. One way
to examine whether such moving introduces large biases is to compare the effects
of 1960 neighbourhood on those who stayed to those who moved, and in Section 4
we examine this using a somewhat restricted and truncated sample that is different
from our main sample: Because the tracts are not directly comparable across the
two censuses, we construct aggregations of tracts that are comparable. Langen
(1975, appendix D) provides a catalogue of 5,298 such comparable units. In many
circumstances there were no changes made to tract boundaries, and the 'aggre-
gation' consists of a single tract. But some of Langen 's tract aggregations are very
large, the largest being Oslo, the capital, in which the tracts were completely
redrawn." In order to examine how stable neighbourhood effects are, we will
consider a subsample of Langen's aggregations. We restrict the sample to aggre-
gations with fewer than 4,000 inhabitants in 1970, and exclude all tracts from the
1960 census that were split across municipalities in the years between 1960 and
1970. For the purpose of examining the effect of moving, we limit our sample to
those aged 0-4 in the 1960 census, who we can expect to live with their parents at
the time of the 1970 census.
2.2. Outcome Variables and Observed Family Background
We classify all children living in the same private household as siblings, excluding
all institutional households. For parental classification, we use the recorded
information on 'responsible adults' in the household. The 'responsible adults' are
in the majority of cases biological parents, but to the extent that children live apart
from their biological parents the head of the household and the spouse of the
head are indicated as 'responsible adults' in the census. In 1960 only l.5% of our
sample lived in a household without any biological parents, compared to 3.2% in
1970.
Our measure of adult educational attainment of our main sample is taken from
the register of the level of education maintained by Statistics Norway Vassenden
(1995). This register provides a detailed code of the type of the highest completed
education, the completion date and how many years of schooling the highest
completed education corresponds to. For individuals with no recent education,
their level of education as of the 1970 census is recorded.
5 Studies such as Kremer (1997), Topa (2001) and Conley and Topa (2002) are examples using US
census tracts as local neighbourhoods, but in different frameworks than ours. Solon el al. (2000 endnote
9) note that the average size of lowest-levelunits in the National Longitudinal Study ofYouth is 200-250
dwelling units.
6 As the research leading to these aggregations was financed by a programme on rural regions, the
lists linking addresses to tracts in urban areas were not used.
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Our measure of adult earnings is constructed from administrative data that are
collected from tax returns and various government agencies. We use the 1990-5
observations of a category of earnings that is used to calculate accumulation of
insurance benefits. This definition includes wages, income from self-employment,
unemployment benefits and sick-leave payments, but excludes capital income,
social assistance, pensions and other transfers. Unemployment insurance and
sickness benefits are included as these are conditional on previous employment
and we do not want fluctuations due to transitory unemployment or sickness
periods to affect our estimates. We inflate all numbers by the Consumer Price
Index, and exclude all observations from before the completion of education or of
less than NOK 10,000 at 1995 prices. Since there may be secular trends and life-
cycle effects in our outcome measures, all the numbers we calculate in this article
are residuals from a regression on dummy variables indicating the year of birth,
following Solon et al. (2000). We calculate the mean of the logarithm of these
observations for each individual.
Whereas our measure of adult education is the natural one, our measure of
adult earnings is potentially more problematic (Haider and Solon, 2004). The
parameters we estimate are only defined for those who actually participate in the
labour market and patterns in measurement error caused by differential partici-
pation rates may bias our results. However, we only exclude a small proportion of
the population because of restrictions on earnings. Table 1 shows that only about
2.5% of males and 6.5% of the females have earnings below the threshold in all six
years. More than 75% of males have earnings above the threshold in all six years,
this proportion is somewhat lower for women. Since participation is high and fairly
constant for both genders, exclusion of observations below the threshold is
unlikely to cause major biases.
Even if differential participation does not cause large systematic biases, it could
still be the case that our measure is very poorly related to lifetime labour earnings.
We are unable address this question for the sample we use in this article. We have,
however, looked into how our measure performs over the life-cycle of the 1942
cohort, for which we have labour earnings (same definition used in this article) for
1967-2002. This covers the ages 25-60, for which we have calculated an 'ideal'
Table 1
The Distribution of Years of Earnings by Gender and Birth Cohorts
Years behind earnings measure
O 2 3 4 5 6
Males
1946-55 0.028 0.023 0.027 0.024 0.037 0.040 0.820
1956-65 0.023 0.035 0.042 0.039 0.051 0.060 0.751
Females
1946-55 0.067 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.060 0.053 0.703
1956-65 0.065 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.069 0.079 0.625
Note: Numbers ofyears 1990-95 in which earnings are above NOK (1995) 10,000. Based on the sample
of all residents in the two age-groups that are present in the relevant censuses.
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Table 2
Comparison Of Samples with Population
1946-55 cohorts 1956-65 cohorts
Earnings Education Pop. Earnings Education Pop.
Male:
mean age 44.48 44.48 44.56 34.38 34.39 34.41
mean education (years) 11.53 11.45 11.58 11.89 11.86 11.91
(standard deviation) 2.89 2.92 2.93 2.30 2.39 2.30
mean log av earnings 12.31 12.30 12.31 12.19 12.20 12.20
1995
(standard deviation) 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55
share full time 0.735 0.704 0.714 0.733 0.720 0.726
working 1995
share unemployed 0.075 0.074 0.072 0.108 0.108 0.107
1995
number of people 106287 113739 290345 122413 125436 297734
Female:
mean age 44.49 44.48 44.55 34.40 34.41 34.47
mean education (years) 11.00 10.88 10.99 11.84 11.74 11.82
(standard deviation) 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.29 2.27 2.28
mean log av earnings 11.77 11.76 11.77 11.67 11.66 11.68
1995
(standard deviation) 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.66
share full time 0.460 0.429 0.430 0.436 Q.408 0.412
working 1995
share unemployed 0.064 0.064 0.063 0.102 0.103 0.100
1995
number of people 92581 103109 278381 103308 114549 286074
Note: The table compares the samples that remains after linking the administrative files with the census
files and restricting the sample to tracts with at least two families of two individuals with non-missing
observations.
measure: present value oflife-time labour earnings. We then calculate the measure
we use in this article at the relevant age-groups and correlate this with the log-
arithm of present value of labour earnings. For the age-groups with comparable
participation rates we then have correlations between log present value of earnings
and our measure between 0.77 and 0.82.7 These correlation suggest that our
measure of earnings approximates life-time earnings quite well. While there might
well be some attenuation bias from measurement error, it is unlikely that sys-
tematic changes in attenuation invalidates our analysis of changes in sibling and
neighbour correlations.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of our sample compared to the full popu-
lation from the administrative data in 1995. To be included in our sample, a family
must include at least two children aged 5-14 at the time of the census. We restrict
ourselves to the families with at least two brothers or two sisters in the relevant age-
group. This restriction implies that our estimating samples are smaller than the
full population of the relevant age-group. Even so, it does not seem that the
7 The correlation is lower for the younger women, at 0.62, but participation rates for young women of
the 1942 cohort are also very low and different from those in Table I: 27% have no years of earnings
and only 28% have earnings above the threshold in all years.
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samples are much different from the full population in terms of observed char-
acteristics. There is a limited increase in the average years of education from the
older to the younger cohorts, and this increase is stronger for women. The vari-
ance of the years of educations decreases from the older to the younger cohorts.
The same is true of annual earnings, but this may simply reflect that earnings are
measured at two different stages of the life-cycle. Our samples are orders of
magnitude larger than that of Solon et al. (2000), who use 687 individuals from
144 clusters to examine educational attainment, Page and Solon (2003) use 443
individuals from 120 clusters to examine male earnings.
The measure we have of the educational attainment of the parents of individuals
from our main sample is different. From the 1970 census we have education
recorded as years of schooling. The 1960 measure of education is a categorical
classification. We could in principle use a set of dummy indicators to correct for
parental education but this would identify the coefficients from those neigh-
bourhoods with two or more parents with the same educational background, and
the 1960 and 1970 measures would not be comparable. We have therefore trans-
formed the categorical parental education codes into years of education. We use
repeated observations of the same individuals to construct a mapping from the
1960 codes to years of schooling, and then apply this mapping to all parents,
regardless of whether we have in fact repeated observations of this parent.
2.3. Estimation
Estimation of the covariance of some characteristic within a group is not a difficult
problem. There are many ways to combine these within-group estimates, but note
that observations here consist of pairs of siblings. A family of 2 siblings contributes
one such pair, a family of 3 contributes 3 and so on: With S siblings, there are
S(S - 1)/2 unique pairs. Solon et al. (2000) provides (6) as an estimator of the
covariance between siblings of a variable y with E(y) = O,
(6)
Here c denotes neighbourhood, f denotes family and s denotes sibling, the We and
We? are weights and SeJis the number of siblings in family fin neighbourhood c.
Solon et al. considered four different weighting schemes. In practice, we have
found the differences among estimates with different weighting schemes to be
negligible. All estimates in this article give all sibling-pairs and neighbour-pairs
equal weight regardless of whether they came from large or small families and
neighbourhoods. To centre the observation on zero, we follow Solon et al. and first
regress the variable in question on dummies for each year of birth.
The estimation of neighbourhood correlations is complicated by the fact that we
want the correlation of one individual in a family with all other individuals except its
siblings, so that the neighbourhood covariance is not contaminated by sibling
correlations in small neighbourhoods. For a pair of families with SeJand Sef siblings
there are Sepef unique pairs, and ifthere are Ffamilies in the neighbourhood, there
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are F(F - 1)/2 unique family pairs. Solon et al. provide an estimator of the neigh-
bourhood correlations that is similar in spirit to (6),
c [ (S'I s,!, )1 li c'" '" '" ",Yc!,Yc/'!/ '" '"L Wc L Wc//'L L--- L Wc//' L Wc·
c=1 /N' s=1 !/=1 Sc/Scf' /N' c=1
(7)
In order to adjust for the effect of observed family characteristics, we follow Solon
et al. (2000) and regress Yc/s on a vector of observed characteristics Xc/ and
neighbourhood dummies. Subtracting the covariance of the predicted family-
effects from the total covariance, as indicated in (5), and dividing by the total
variance of ycfs> we obtain neighbour correlations that are adjusted for observed
family characteristics.
We have no analytical expression for the variance of these estimators. Solon et al.
use balanced half-samples to take into account the complex sampling procedure of
the PSID data. We have chosen a bootstrap procedure that resamples blocks of
data and repeats all initial corrections for every resampled set of data. Since
neighbourhoods close together may well be have spatially correllated outcomes, we
use municipalities as units of resampling for both the sibling and neighbour
correlations. Since we have complete coverage of a whole economy that is spread
over a relatively large geographical area, we believe that there is limited room for
spatial correlation to bias the standard errors, and that our strategy of resampling
on municipalities provides us conservatively large estimates of the standard errors.
Calculation of the bootstraps are computationally expensive, and we have limited
the number of replication to 250.8
3. Results
In this Section we first report the empirical sibling and neighbour correlations.
Then we present our preferred estimates of the upper bounds of neighbourhood
effects that accounts for sorting on observed family characteristics. Finally, we
report family effects, net of the impact of siblings growing up in the same
neighbourhoods. In all cases, we show the estimates by gender, sets of birth
cohorts and adult outcome measure. Several robustness checks are performed to
back our interpretation of the numbers as reliable estimates of neighbourhood
and family effects, including discussions of how regional differences and neigh-
bourhood misclassification affect our estimated neighbour correlations. We close
this section with a discussion of policy changes during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
that are candidates for explaining our results.
3.1. Sibling and Neighbour Correlations in Education and Earnings
The sibling and neighbour correlations are shown in Table 3. The brother cor-
relation in years of schooling is around 0.42 and somewhat higher, around 0.46,
8 With 250 replications there is still some variation in the standard errors when starting at different
random seeds, but this variation is much to small to influence inference in any important way (evidence
available on request).
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Table 3
Correlation in Education and Adult Earnings Among Siblings and Neighbouring
Children.
Females 0.1480
(0.0053)
0.1645
(0.0043)
Neighbours
1946-55 1956-65
0.1121 0.0612
(0.0261) (0.0075)
0.0590 0.0245
(0.01ll) (0.0030)
0.1105 0.0602
(0.0260) (0.0076)
0.0494 0.0206
(0.0094) (0.0032)
0.0163
(0.0034)
0.1027 0.0653
(0.0213) (0.0095)
0.0493 0.0245
(0.0062) (0.0046)
0.1013 0.0642
(0.0046) (0.0050)
0.0405 0.0202
(0.0205) (0.0095)
0.0153
(0.0050)
0.0591 0.0283
(0.0074) (0.0051)
0.0499 0.0252
(0.0059) (0.0047)
0.0584 0.0280
(0.0077) (0.0048)
0.0470 0.0245
(0.0053) (0.0052)
0.0221
(0.0051)
0.0292 0.0201
(0.0055) (0.0024)
0.0225 0.0141
(0.0041) (0.0022)
0.0287 0.0197
(0.0051) (0.0024)
0.0206 0.0127
(0.0036) (0.0021)
0.0104
(0.0021)
Siblings
1946-55 1956-65
Education 1995
Males 0.4150
(0.0088)
0.4213
(0.0075)
Adjusted for parental education (PE)
Adjusted for family structure (FS)
Adjusted for PE and FS
Adjusted for PE, FS and parental income
Females 0.4561
(0.0064)
0.4739
(0.0080)
Adjusted for parental education (PE)
Adjusted for family structure (FS)
Adjusted for PE and FS
Adjusted for PE, FS and parental income
Average log Earnings 1990-95
Males 0.2032
(0.0082)
0.1845
(0.0059)
Adjusted for parental education (PE)
Adjusted for family structure (FS)
Adjusted for PE and FS
Adjusted for PE, FS and parental income
Adjusted for parental education (PE)
Adjusted for family structure (FS)
Adjusted for PE and FS
Adjusted for PE, FS and parental income
Note. Estimated on the full population of those aged between 5-15 in the year of the census in families
with at least 2 children in this age span, and in neighbourhoods with at least two such families.
Correlations in education based on 1995 data, the earnings measure is the mean of logarithm of
earnings 1990-5, dropping those years before completion of education or with less than NOK (1995)
10,000 in earnings.
The variables for parental education include a 4th degree polynomial in mother's and father's
education and a first degree interaction term and dummies for whether any of these are missing. The
family structure variables include indictors for whether parents are currently divorced, separated,
presence of a step-parent or non-biological parents, single parents and size of the household. Parental
income consists of the logarithm of the income of the responsible adults and indiciators for whether any
of these are missing.
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for sisters. These figures are surprisingly similar to those found for other countries.
According to Solon (1999), sibling correlations in years of education in the US are
a little higher than 0.5. Table 3 also reveals that the gender-specific education
correlation is fairly stable across cohorts, with a slightly higher correlation for the
younger birth cohorts. Thus, the total impact of familyand neighbourhood
characteristics shared by siblings seems to be constant over time. The neighbour
correlations in education are much lower. While the male correlation is higher
among those born 1946--55, the gender difference is negligible in the younger
cohorts. While Solon et al. (2000) report an unadjusted neighbour correlation of
around 0.2 in the US, neighbourhoods seem to be less important in Norway."
Moreover, the impact oflocation during childhood seems to have fallen over time,
since the neighbour correlation is considerably lower in the younger birth cohorts.
It drops from 0.112 to 0.061 for males and from 0.103 to 0.065 for females.
Correlations are considerably lower when we look at earnings. The sibling cor-
relations in the range of 0.15-0.20 are similar to figures found in previous studies.
Bjorklund et al. (2002) find that brother correlations in Nordic countries are sig-
nificantly lower than the typical 0.3-0.4 found in recent US studies. In spite of the
higher education correlation for sisters, we find that earnings are less correlated
among sisters than among brothers. lO The brother correlation drops from the
oldest to the youngest cohorts, from 0.203 to 0.185, while the earnings correlation
for sisters increases from 0.148 to 0.165.
The neighbour correlations in adult earnings are positive, and higher for
neighbouring boys than for girls. For the older birth cohorts, the correlation in
adult earnings among neighbouring boys is 0.059 and 0.029 for girls. The higher
male correlation is found in both cohorts. As for education, the male correlation is
reduced by approximately one half from the 1946--55 to the 1956--65 cohorts and
somewhat less for females.
To summarise, the correlations indicate that both families and neighbourhoods
matter. Local childhood communities have become less important in explaining
the overall variation in adult outcomes over time, and the gender difference has
been reduced as well.
3.2. Neighbourhood Effects
The neighbour correlations in Table 3 are upward biased measures of the true
influence neighbourhoods have on individuals, due to sorting of families into
communities. Resemblance in adult outcomes among persons who spent their
childhoods in the same community may partly, or even completely, reflect that
neighbouring children experience similar family environments. In Table 3 we also
report adjusted neighbour correlations in years of schooling where we subtract the
covariance in effects of observed family characteristics. Il
9 Note, however, that the estimates of Solon et al. (2000) have standard errors around 0.05.
10 Bound et al. (1986) finds that sisters are more similar than brothers, but they examine residuals
from wage equations.
11 To prevent family background coefficients from being affected by neighbourhood effects, these
are estimated with neighbourhood dummies.
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When we partial out the effect of parental education the correlations drop con-
siderably. Family structure characteristics are less important, as the numbers are
very similar to the unadjusted figures. When combining the two sets of family
background variables available for both cohorts, the correlation drops consider-
ably, from 0.112 to 0.049 for males and from 0.103 to 0.041 for females in the
1946-55 cohorts. The impact of the family background adjustment is similar for
the 1956-65 cohorts. The neighbour correlations for males and females have be-
come more similar over time. Parental income information is only available for the
younger cohort and this adjustment reduces the correlation slightly.
In Table 3 we also report bounds on the neighbourhood effects on adult
earnings. After subtracting the contribution of parental education, we find that the
neighbour correlations fall in both cohorts and for both men and women. Family
structure is less important for education. Including parental income among the
family controls has a negative, but modest, effect on the correlations.
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the estimates in Table 3. First,
observed family sorting into neighbourhoods does not fully explain the resem-
blance in adult earnings among persons who grew up in the same neighbourhood.
Second, neighbourhoods have become less important as determinants of adult
earnings. This is consistent with, and presumably partly explained by, the declining
effects of neighbourhoods on educational attainment. Third, childhood location
seems to have stronger effects on adult earnings for males than for females. This
gender difference in earnings correlations among neighbouring children is pre-
sent for both cohorts. Finally, the family background adjustment wipes out the
difference between earnings and schooling correlations. While the unadjusted
neighbour correlations are much higher for education than earnings, they are
strikingly similar after having a<ljusted for observed family sorting into neigh-
bourhoods, especially for the younger cohorts.
One might ask what the correlations mean in terms of absolute size of neigh-
bourhood effects. If we consider male earnings, we use the upper bound and the
variance from Table 2, and find that the standard deviation of the neighbourhood
effects to be smaller than 0.124 and 0.086 for the older and younger cohorts
respectively.l" Although the correlations may seem low, the variance is large en-
ough that the bounds on neighbourhood effects are in no way negligible.
3.3. Family Effects
Previous studies of sibling correlations do not disentangle family from neigh-
bourhood effects. The only exception, to our knowledge, is Page and Solon
(2003). Table 3 suggests that family background is by far more important than
neighbourhoods, but the sibling correlations also include the effects of siblings
growing up in the same neighbourhoods. In this Section we tighten the bound on
family effects using the method described in Section l.
The lower bound on family effects on education is 0.366 for older males. In the
younger cohorts, we find that at least 0.401 of the male variance in schooling is
12 The estimates of neighbour correlation are those ad'usted for arental education and family
structure. The bound is calculated as sd(/J'Z,) :o:: sd(Y'ji) COrradj. if" Yif'/).
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explained by factors, other than childhood location, which siblings share. The
female estimates are 0.416 and 0.454, respectively. Thus the lower bound on family
effects has increased slightly for both men and women.l"
Considering male earnings, the lower bound on family effects is very similar for
the two cohorts, 0.156 among those born 1946-55 compared to 0.160 for those
born ten years later. Consequently, weaker neighbourhood effects could poten-
tially account for all of the decrease in brother correlations in Table 3.
For females, the lower bound on the family effects on adult earnings is actually
increasing from 0.127 in the older cohorts compared to 0.152 in the younger. This
suggests that the higher earnings correlation among brothers compared to sisters
in the older cohorts is partly explained by larger neighbourhood effects on
earnings for males. While family effects on educational attainment seem to be
somewhat stronger for females than for males, the gender difference is smaller for
earnings. The lower bound on family effects on earnings in the younger cohort is
basically the same for both genders.
Since it seems that the impact of neighbourhoods has declined, one might
wonder why the sibling-correlation did not decline correspondingly. But such a
decline a is not a necessary consequence. If fewer families are financially con-
strained when making human investments, other mechanisms which tend to create
homogeneous families may well become more important. For instance, if ability
sorting into education is important, it may well be that poorer families, formerly
restricted from investing in all of their promising children, can afford to send all of
them on to higher education as the effective price of attendance drops.
3.4. Robustness Checks
In this Section we discuss whether the neighbour correlations, and particularly the
drop over time, could reflect other mechanisms than declining neighbourhood
effects. We first check whether the neighbourhood effects represent permanent
regional effects rather than impact of childhood local community. Then we
address the decline in light of changes in neighbourhood boundaries, sorting,
measurement error in permanent earnings and misclassification of childhood
community. These are all alternative explanations for why the upper bound on
neighbourhood effects is reduced.
The neighbour correlations may reflect impact of regional characteristics rather
than local effects. In other words, what we label neighbourhood effects may rep-
resent permanent differences between children growing up in different regions
(e.g. urban vs non-urban areas). Moreover, in the case of adult earnings it may also
reflect interaction of location preferences and regional price levels (Griliches,
1979). It is well documented that workers in urban areas in the US are paid a
premium for living and working there.i" If resemblance in adult earnings among
13 All the bounds discussed in this Section are based on the largest set of family background char-
acteristics that is available for both the older and younger cohorts.
14 Using our measure of earnings in a Mincer earnings equation including schooling, experience,
experience squared, gender and regional dummies, the largest difference is 0.125 log points between
the counties Aust-Agder (with lowearnings) and Akershus.
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neighbouring children simply reflects the interaction between geographical loca-
tion preferences and regional wage and price differences, heavily influenced by
where they grew up, it is only weakly related to what people think of as neigh-
bourhood effects on adult welfare. Since we neither have a model of geographical
mobility, nor good regional wage and price indices, we perform a simple check
where neighbour correlations are estimated within childhood county. We add 20
county dummies to birth year variables in the process of constructing the outcome
measure, and we only predict family effects on within county variation. In this way
we condition out all effects of adult location that are explained by the region in
which the person spent his childhood and thereby all variation in neighbourhoods
across counties. If all the effects are associated with region rather than neigh-
bourhood, or if location preferences explained the correlations, we would expect
the neighbour correlations to vanish. Table 4 reports the sibling and neighbour
Table 4
Correlation in Education and Adult Earnings Among Siblings and Neighbouring
Children. Within Regions
Siblings Neighbours
1946-55 1946-55 1956-651956-65
Education 1995
Males
Within childhood county 0.4057 0.4177 0.0885
(0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0182)
0.0587
(0.0121)
0.0879
(0.0184)
0.0563
(0.0135)
0.4495 0.4694 0.0787
(0.0052) (0.0070) (0.0112)
0.0485
(0.0051)
0.0781
(0.0114)
0.0460
(0.0058)
Adjusted for parental education (PE)
Adjusted for family structure (FS)
Adjusted for PE and FS
Adjusted for PE, FS and parental income
Females
Within childhood county
Adjusted for parental education (PE)
Adjusted for Family structure (FS)
Adjusted for PE and FS
Adjusted for PE, FS and parental income
Average wg Earnings 1990-95
Males
Within childhood county 0.1714
(0.0052)
0.1831
(0.0065)
0.0310
(0.0036)
0.0259
(0.0029)
0.0307
(0.0036)
0.0251
(0.0033)
Adjusted for parental education (PE)
Adjusted for family structure (FS)
Adjusted for PE and FS
Adjusted for PE, FS and parental income
0.0562
(0.0065)
0.0270
(0.0032)
0.0556
(0.0061)
0.0247
(0.0031)
0.0220
(0.0035)
0.0622
(0.0082)
0.0295
(0.0049)
0.0616
(0.0086)
0.0270
(0.0043)
0.0240
(0.0049)
0.0131
(0.0023)
0.0131
(0.0020)
0.0107
(0.0020)
0.0129
(0.0022)
0.0087
(0.0022)
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Table 4
Continued
[JANUARY
Siblings Neighbours
1946-55 1956-65 1946-55 1956-65
Females
Within childhood county 0.1406
(0.0045)
0.1579
(0.0046)
0.0127
(0.0013)
0.0089
(0.0014)
0.0125
(0.0013)
0.0083
(0.0014)
0.0117
(0.0012)
0.0071
(0.0012)
0.0115
(0.0012)
0.0063
(0.0012)
0.0050
(0.0013)
Adjusted for parental education (PE)
Adjusted for family structure (FS)
Adjusted for PE and FS
Adjusted for PE, FS and parental income
Note. Estimated on the full population of those aged between 5-15 in the year of the census in families
with at least 2 children in this age span, and in neighbourhoods with at least two such families.
Correlations in education based on 1995 data, the earnings measure is the mean of logarithm of
earnings 1990-5, dropping those years before completion of education or with less than NOK (1995)
10,000in earnings. Both the outcome variable and the observed family characteristics have their county
mean subtracted.
The variables for parental education include a 4th degree polynomial in mother's and father's
education and a first degree interaction term and dummies for whether any of these are missing. The
family structure variables include indictors for whether parents are currently divorced, separated,
presence of a step-parent or non-biological parents, single parents and size of the household. Parental
income consists of the logarithm of the income of the responsible adults and indiciators for whether any
of these are missing.
correlations, estimated within childhood county. By comparing Table 3 and
Table 4, we find that the brother and sister correlations in adult outcomes are
basically unchanged.
The neighbourhood effects on educational attainment drop significantly, but do
not disappear. Considering schooling years of the oldest cohorts first, the neigh-
bour correlations are reduced by approximately 25% when we estimate within
regions. Adjusting for childhood county has no important impact on the younger
cohorts, although the within-county estimates are lower for both men and women.
Earnings correlation estimates are more affected by the childhood-region
adjustment. This is what we would expect if they were driven by regional wage and
price differentials, since these will partly be accounted by adult location being
strongly affected by childhood region. Comparing Tables 3 and 4 we see that the
neighbour correlations in earnings drop by about 50% when we estimate within
counties. We also report the family background adjusted estimates in Table 4
following the same procedure as in Table 3. The adjustment does reduce the
correlations, especially for females where the neighbour correlations in earnings
end up below 0.01. The lower effects of neighbourhoods in the younger cohorts
remain for both males and females. It is important to emphasise that the within-
county estimates neglect all the effects of variation in neighbourhoods between
counties and this downward bias can be substantial. To summarise, neighbour-
hood effects remain positive and declining even if we estimate within counties.
© Royal Economic Society 2005
35
2006] WHAT IT USED TO BE 295
The next question is whether the change in neighbourhood boundaries be-
tween 1960 and 1970 is responsible. However, neighbourhoods were more nar-
rowly defined in 1970 and the average number of residents was lower than in 1960.
As the 1970 classification represents smaller communities, one would expect the
estimated correlations to increase rather than fall.
In the cohort comparison we measure income at different points of the life
cycle. The two sets of cohorts are measured while 25-40 and 35-50 years of age
respectively. Whereas we have preferred to use permanent earnings, the correla-
tions will be biased downward by measurement error or transitory components in
our measure of average earnings (Solon et al., 1991). One might expect that we
have a more noisy earnings measure for the younger cohort, potentially explaining
the drop in the neighbour correlation. But any important bias of this kind would
also affect the sibling correlations. With a simple measurement error model, the
estimated correlation is proportional to the correlation in permanent earnings.
Assume that any difference between our observed earnings and permanent earn-
ings is generated by the same model for siblings and neighbours. If the drop in the
estimated neighbour correlation was generated by a different degree measurement
error, we would expect a similar relative decline in the sibling correlations. The
stability, and even slight increase for women, suggests that this bias is likely to be
small.
We interpret the estimates as upper bounds on the neighbour effects and the
true effects can be constant if sorting on unobserved family characteristics has
decreased over time. We check this explanation by looking at how adult education
is distributed within and between neighbourhoods over time, since we expect any
trend in sorting on unobserved family background to be similar to the trend in
sorting on observed characteristics. If sorting decreased from 1960 to 1970, one
would expect the between-neighbourhood component of the total variance in
adult education to fall. Table 5 shows the opposite. Consequently, weaker sorting
leading to an upper bound which is closer to the true neighbourhood effect in the
younger cohorts does not seem to be the explanation.
Finally, community misclassification error may explain the drop in neighbour-
hood correlation if family mobility increased during the 1950s and throughout the
1960s. We only observe location at one point in time. Since families move,
Table 5
Degree of Neighbourhood Sorting
Mother's education Father's education
Mean
1960 1970 1960 1970
8.008 8.627 8.641 0.932
0.557 0.900 0.935 1.269
1.578 1.194 2.274 2.516
0.104 0.177 0.145 0.203
fT,
1> = fT~/(fT~ + fT;)
Note. Decomposition of the variance of adult educational attainment at the time of the censuses.
Estimates from the regression E;, = it. + u, + f;, (with neighbourhood fixed effects). Calculated on
the population of individuals aged 30-50 at the time of the censuses.
© Royal Economic Society 2006
36
296 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [JANUARY
neighbourhood effects tend to be downward biased for both cohorts. On the other
hand, families tend to move to similar neighbourhoods. A recent study for the US
(Kunz et al., 2003) shows that one-year observation of location does not create a
significant bias in the neighbourhood effects, but this conclusion may not be
applicable to Norwegian data. This misclassification explanation cannot be
checked for the full samples, as changing boundaries makes a substantial number
of neighbourhoods non-comparable over time. Using the subset of comparable
geographical units described in Section l, we estimate different correlations of
those who stay in the same and those who move to a different neighbourhood
during the 1970s. We limit ourselves to those aged 0-4 in 1960, because we want to
follow children who can be expected to live with their parents ten years later. As we
discussed in Section l, these tract-aggregates contain more individuals and they
cover larger geographical areas than the original units.
The first column in Table 6 report the neighbour correlations for the 1956-60
cohorts, based on those individuals who spent at least some of their first five years
in the aggregated tracts, but with the same definitions of neighbourhoods as in the
previous Tables. The second column is based on the aggregated tracts, using the
same set of individuals. As expected, aggregation implies that correlations fall
somewhat. Splitting stayers and movers in column three and four, all correlations
are lower for movers than for stayers, suggesting that mobility does create a slight
downward bias. For male earnings, the correlation among stayers is twice that of
movers. Even if misclassification may have increased over time, the magnitude of
the difference between stayers and movers is too small to provide an explanation
for the drop in neighbour correlations over time.
Since changing neighbourhood boundaries, weaker sorting of families into
neighbourhoods, measurement error in earnings or misclassification of neigh-
bourhoods cannot explain the drop in neighbour correlations over time, we are
fairly confident that the true impact of location during childhood has declined.
Table 6
Stayers and Movers
All (tracts) All (aggregations) Stayers Movers
Education
Male 0.0593 0.0444 0.0482 0.0363
(0.0074) (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0119)
Female 0.0589 0.0400 0.0418 0.0311
(0.0102) (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0131)
Earnings
Male 0.0334 0.0296 0.0377 0.0173
(0.0031) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0052)
Female 0.0201 0.0155 0.0164 0,01 14
(0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0028)
Note. Neighbour correlations for sample of stayers and movers. The sample includes those aged 0-5 in
1960 and with mothers living in one of 4,969 tract aggregations with fewer than 4,000 inhibitants and
not containing 1960 tracts that were split among several tracts in the 1970 census. The first column
summarises this sample at the lower tract level, stayers and movers inclusive. The group "stayers" lived
in the same tract aggregation in 1970 as in 1960, while the "movers" (27.5% of the sample) had moved
to some different tract aggregation.
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Although attributing this change to public policies must be speculative, we want
to point to some reforms and policy changes that we find likely to have played a
role.
3.5. Possible Explanations of Declining Neighbourhood Effects
Local government services have been an important component in the building of
the Norwegian welfare state after the Second World War. In the late 1940s real per
capita local government spending increased by an annual rate of9%, remaining at
a high level of around 5% during the next three decades Borge and Rattsø, 2002).
As a consequence, local public spending as a percentage of GDP increased from
9% in the late 1940s to around 16% in the 1970s. During the same period, the
relative variation in spending across municipalities declined sharply. In the years
before and after the Second World War, the tax base given by the local private
income level largely explained the variation in spending across municipalities.
Redistributive measures such as central government grants to municipalities were
gradually introduced, and by 1980 the correlation between current per capita
municipal spending and private income had changed from large and positive to
negative. As far as neighbourhood institutions providing primary school and
health care services are concerned, the first three decades after the Second World
War were characterised by an overall expansion and an equalisation of spending
across municipalities (Falch and Tovmo, 2003).
The school reforms implemented in the 1960s and 1970s are particularly
interesting as possible explanations for the drop in neighbourhood effect for the
cohorts growing up around 1960 and 1970. Norway experienced a sequence of
school reforms during this period. The reform of the primary school system during
the 1950s introduced a common curriculum in all communities, as well as access to
the same number of teaching hours throughout the country. The comprehensive
school reform of the 1960s increased the minimum level of schooling from 7 to 9
years, unified the education system and provided a common curriculum for all
schools. In the 1970s regional colleges were established to enhance equality of
opportunity in terms of transition to higher education for people growing up in all
regions. The total number of students in higher education grew by 53% between
1971 and 1981 (Statistics Norway, 2001, Table 190).
The comprehensive school reform that was implemented between 1960 and
1970 was probably the most extensive. This aimed at raising the level of education,
smoothing the transition into higher education and enhancing equality of
opportunities across socio-economic and geographical backgrounds. It is expected
that this reform reduced the effect of family background as well as neighbour-
hoods from 1960 to 1970. While most of the cohorts born between 1946--55
completed compulsory education before the reform, the 1956--65 cohorts went to
the new comprehensive schools. Analyses of the participation rate to higher edu-
cation for cohorts born from 1942-70 show a strong degree of regional equalisa-
tion (Haegeland et al., 1999). The comprehensive school reform weakened the
impact of socio-economic background on transition to higher education (Aakvik
et al., 2003).
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Access to student grants and loans was expanded in the late 1960s and early
1970s. A grant for students older than 16 who lived more than 40 km away
from their parents was introduced in 1968. Generally, from the age of 18 all
students were entitled to a subsidised loan which covered living expenses.
Tuition fees at Norwegian universities have been negligible. One motivation for
the student grant and loan scheme introduced during the late 1960s was to
promote equality of opportunity, such that educational qualifications could be
attained independent of geographical location, age, gender, economic or social
status.i''
4. Concluding Remarks
Family background and childhood neighbourhood play an important role in
explaining adult education and earnings. While most studies evaluating the
combined effects of family and neighbourhoods are from the US, we present
evidence from a country with different labour market institutions, educational
system and welfare policies. Census data from Norway enable us to construct
neighbourhoods and use a detailed set of family background variables. We focus
on whether the impacts of neighbourhoods and families have changed over time,
estimating separate parameters for children born 1946-55 and those born ten
years later. Our main results can be summarised as follows.
Neighbour correlations in years of schooling for the 1946-55 birth cohorts are
0.112 for boys and 0.103 for girls. The log earnings correlations are estimated to be
0.059 and 0.029, respectively. Comparing the 1946-55 with the 1956-65 birth
cohorts, we find a declining effect of neighbourhoods as the correlations are
reduced by approximately one half.
Neighbour correlations are upward biased estimates of the influence of local
childhood environments because similar families cluster in communities. We
tighten the bound on the variance of neighbourhood effects by using data on
observed family background. Adjusting for observed family background, the cor-
relations drop considerably, for education down to 0.043 and 0.041 for the oldest
boys and girls, respectively. Earnings correlations among neighbouring children
born 1946-55 are reduced to 0.047 and 0.021, for boys and girls respectively. In the
younger cohorts the neighbour correlations are about half that of the older
cohorts.
We discuss whether the decline in neighbour correlation reflects changes in
neighbourhood boundaries or reduced sorting of families into communities, and
reject these explanations. Although higher geographical mobility among parents
and measurement error in adult earnings for the younger cohorts may contribute
to lower earnings correlations among neighbouring children over time, these
factors only explain a minor part.
The impact of families, net of neighbourhood effects shared by siblings, is found
to be fairly stable across cohorts. For adult earnings we find adjusted brother
15 This was later formulated in the first paragraph in "Lov om utdanningsstøtte til elever og stud-
enter", lawof 26.04.1985. no. 21.
© RoyalEconomic Society 2005
39
2006] WHAT IT USED TO BE 299
correlations of 0.156 and 0.160, for the older and younger cohorts respectively.
The corresponding sister correlations are 0.127 and 0.152, suggesting a conver-
gence between genders.
Families and neighbourhoods have weaker effects on adult outcomes in Norway
than in the US, adding to the evidence that intergenerational mobility is higher in
the Scandinavian welfare states than in the US (Bjorklund and jåntti, 1997). We
offer no rigorous tests of why neighbourhoods explain a lower fraction of the
variation in adult outcomes among the younger cohorts; however, we single out
the expansion of local government services in general, and education reforms in
particular, as important candidates. These policies were implicitly targeted to
promote equality of opportunity. These policy reforms affected the post-war birth
cohorts differently. In particular, those born after 1955 faced a more similar school
system and lower costs of educational investment than those born during the
previous decade.
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Summary
• School quality is hard to define and measure. It is influenced by not
only school expenditures, but also characteristics that are hard to
measure like norms and peer effects among teachers and pupils. Fur-
thermore, family background and community characteristics are im-
portant in explaining educational outcomes. In this paper we study
the composite effect of primary schools and neighbourhoods on adult
educational attainment controlling for family characteristics. Instead
of identifying the effect of specific neighbourhood and school charac-
teristics on educational attainment, we focus on correlations in final
years of schooling among neighbouring children and school mates.
We find a clear trend of declining influence of childhood location
over the 24 year period (birth cohorts 1947-1970). Then we ask
whether a change in the compulsory schoollaw extending the manda-
tory years of education, can explain this pattern. We find some effect
of the primary school reform on the change in the neighbourhood
effect. Motivated by the fact that neighbouring children typically go to
the same school, we estimate school mate correlations for children
born in the 1960s. The overall impact of factors shared by children
who graduated from the same school at the age of 15/16 is negligible.
The variation in "school quality" and the impact of peers on final
educational attainment seem to have been very limited in Norway .•
JEL classification: 121,J13, R23.
Keywords: Families, neighbours, schools, educational reforms, peer-
effects.
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school mate correlations
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and Erik 0. Sørensen*
There is a controversy both among researchers and among the public
on whether school quality matters, how (much) it matters, why it mat-
ters, and for which outcomes it matters. Empirical results from many
countries have shown that school resources only have a modest im-
pact on student achievement, but a relatively stronger impact on adult
educational attainment.' School quality is hard to define and measure.
It is not only influenced by school expenditures, but also characteris-
tics that are hard to measure like norms, attitudes and peer effects
among teachers and pupils (Hoxby, 2000). Furthermore, family back-
ground is important, and it has become clear that community charac-
teristics-peer effects and neighbourhood institutions-are important
in explaining educational attainment and adult earnings (Solon, et al.
2000; Page and Solon, 2003; Raaum, Salvanes and Sørensen, 2001).
However, few studies focus on the fact the primary flower secon-
dary school constitutes an important factor shared by children grow-
ing up in the same neighbourhood. The three factors, family,
neighbourhoods (both as peer influence and institutions), and
schools, probably also interact strongly as inputs in the human capital
production function. Therefore, the causal effects of the three factors
* We thank Peter Fredriesson, a refereeand the editorfor valuable comments and suggestions.
1 School inputs measured by e.g. expenditures and teacher-pupil ratios appear to
have modest, if any, effect on student achievement such as marks and test scores
(see Hanushek, 2003, and Krueger, 2003, for US results, and Bonesrønning, 2003,
for Norway). However, the same type of school resources seem to have a stronger
impact on post-school outcomes like final educational attainment and earnings,
although these findings are controversial (Betts, 1996; Dearden, Ferri and Meghir,
2002;Dustmann, Rajan and Van Soest, 2003).
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are hard to disentangle, partly because of family sorting into
neighbourhoods and schools. In the present paper, we tty to analyse
the composite effect of primary schools and neighbourhoods, and
attempt to assess their impact on the variance in adult educational at-
tainment. Instead of identifying the effect of specific neighbourhood
and school characteristics on educational attainment, we focus on
correlations in the final years of schooling among neighbouring chil-
dren and school mates.
The starting point for our analysis is twofold. First, in a previous
study we found that the importance of family background was stable
while the effect of neighbourhoods on educational attainment and
earnings is significantly lower for the 1955-65 birth cohort as com-
pared to individuals born 1945-55 (Raaum, Salvanes and Sørensen,
2001). Second, in the 1960s-which is the childhood period for
which the neighbourhood effect was found to be weakened-a pri-
mary school reform took place in Norway, extending the mandatory
level of schooling from seven to nine years. Pre-reform, the Norwe-
gian school system required children to attend school from the age of
seven to the age of fourteen. After the reform, this was extended to
the age of sixteen by adding two more years of mandatory education.
The reform took place over a twelve-year period with different mu-
nicipalities adopting the new school system at different times, allow-
ing for time variation as well as regional variation. Evidence in Aak-
vik, Salvanes and Vaage (2003) suggests that this reform increased the
participation in the above mandatory education as well as the returns
to education.f They also found that the importance of family income
was slightly weakened for post-reform students as compared to pre-
reform students.
Our approach in this paper is to use a unique data set for Norway
on neighbourhoods, schools and parental background to analyse
whether the school reform also had an impact on equalizing the op-
portunity across neighbourhoods.' In addition to aims such as in-
creasing the minimum level of education, and smoothing the transi-
tion to higher education, an important aim was also to increase equal-
2 See Meghir and Palme (2003) for an analysis of the similar Swedish reform that
took place in the 1950s. They also find that the reform had an impact on participa-
tion rates in higher education as well as reducing the impact of family background.
3 See Oreopoulos (2003), Lochner and Morietti (2001) and Pischke (2003) for other
examples of analysing social returns, as opposed to private returns of educational
reforms.
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ity of opportunity along socio-economic and geographic dimensions.
It is this latter aspect that we analyse in this paper. The question is
whether the school reform reduced the importance of the local
neighbourhood. This type of primary school reform took place at
about the same time in many other European countries and we think
that Norway is a good case for analysing social returns of primary
educational reforms, since the potential impact is expected to be
stronger and thus easier to measure in the case of Norway. It has
been pointed out that the Norwegian reform along with the Swedish
reform went further both in the unification of the comprehensive
school system as well as in promoting equality of opportunities
(Leschinsky and Mayer, 1990). We then analyse the effect of schools
as a part of neighbourhood effects byestimating school mate correla-
tions over time, both as unadjusted correlations and controlled for
family sorting. A school mate correlation is an overall measure of
neighbourhood and different types of school effects, including school
resource and peer effect. Again the question is whether school mate
correlations have been reduced over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we de-
scribe our approach. In Section 2 the data set, variable definitions and
the educational reform are described. Section 3 provides the empirical
results and the last section gives some concluding remarks.
1. Neighbour and school mate correlations
In order to study the impact of schools on adult educational attain-
ment as measured by years of education, and to disentangle the family
effects and neighbourhood effects, we use a variance decomposition
approach. The idea is simple. If childhood neighbourhood have long-
lasting effects on welfare, a resemblance in adult outcomes will appear
among persons who grew up in the same local community. The same
line of reasoning applies to schools and children who graduated from
the same institution. Our empirical neighbour (school mate) correla-
tion is an estimate of the proportion of the variance in years of
schooling explained by factors shared by neighbouring children
(school mates).
In order to illustrate the variance decomposition approach, we use
a simple framework suggested by Solon et al. (2000). Let Ycji be the
years of education, for sibling i in familyfin neighbourhood c.
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(1)
where ~,is a vector of all family characteristics that influence years of
education, Z, contains all the neighbourhood characteristics, and ccji
represents unrelated individual factors orthogonal to both family and
neighbourhood effects," The total variance in years of schooling can
be decomposed as:
var(ycji) = var(p Zc)+var(a' X fe)+ 2cov(p' Z"a' Xfe)
+var(ccji)'
(2)
We are looking for the relative influence of neighbourhoods on
schooling, i.e. var(p'Z)/var (yqJ. Empirically, we use the observed co-
variance in educational attainment among neighbouring children from
different families. This covariance, using (1), is given by
COV(Ycji'Yif'i') = var (p' Zc)+ cov( a' Xfe,a'Xr,)
+2 cov(p Z, ,a' X j, ).
(3)
As illustrated in (3), the neighbour covariance contains more than
the variance of neighbourhood effects. The second term represents
clustering of similar families in neighbourhoods. As families typically
sort themselves into neighbourhoods, resemblance in outcomes of
children growing up in the same local community (or school) will also
reflect similar family backgrounds. The third term reflects the extent
to which families are non-randomly distributed across neighbour-
hoods. We expect that advantaged families sort into advantaged
neighbourhoods, reinforcing the impact of a non-random distribution
of families on observed neighbour correlation. In the case of school
mate correlations, compensating resource allocation across schools
will tend to reduce-and possibly even reverse-the positive associa-
tion between family and school effects.
4 Since X and Z are latent vectors that include all relevant variables, the residual is
orthogonal to both.
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Empirically, we can estimate the part ofaXfr related to obseræd
family characteristics, and adjust the correlation, cov(yq;' Ycj'i)/var(ygJ,
by subtracting the covariance in predicted family effects (divided by
the variance). However, since we control only for observed family
characteristics, our estimated neighbour correlation represents an up-
per bound on the neighbourhood effects (see Altonji, 1988; Solon et
al., 2000; and Page and Solon, 2000).5 Obviously, the correlation in
adult outcomes among persons who spent their childhood in the
same local community cannot tell why neighbourhoods matter. It in-
cludes the joint effects of the distribution of characteristics (Z:r) and
their causal effects (/J:r).
"Neighbourhood effects" is a label for a variety of different
mechanisms. The attitudes and behaviour of peers, the existence and
enforcement of social norms as well as local institutions vary across
neighbourhoods. Our focus is on the role of the primary schools as a
potentially important factor shared by neighbouring children. Disen-
tangling the impact of schools from other neighbourhood characteris-
tics is hard as we do not have any reliable information (or assump-
tions) on the sorting of neighbours across schools, e.g. why
neighbouring children go to different schools.
Our approach is less ambitious. First, we estimate the trend in
neighbour correlations over a 25-year period, i.e. birth cohorts 1947-
1970, with and without family background adjustment. As a by-
product, we report estimates of the trend in intergenerational educa-
tional mobility. Second, we focus on specific birth cohorts, 1947-
1956, that were affected by the primary school reform during the
1960s. We exploit this byestimating neighbour correlations in adult
educational attainment by birth cohort for individuals as a function
whether they lived in reform or non-reform municipalities. The idea is
to assess whether the declining impact of neighbourhoods on educa-
tional attainment can be attributed to the introduction of the new
school system. Finally, we look at school effects by means of school
mate correlations. Resemblance in educational attainment among
5 Variance decomposition to obtain the upper bound of effect of observed and
unobserved effects may be preferred to regression analysis where studies often re-
port unstable and small effects of community characteristics when these are directly
included in the estimation equations of adult earnings or educational attainment
(for an overview, see Ginther, Haveman and Wolfe, 2000).
6 By primary school, we mean institutions responsible for compulsory schooling. It
includes what is frequently called (lower) secondary levels.
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children graduating from the same primary school will reflect the total
contribution of school characteristics, including resources and com-
position of pupils. As similar families tend to cluster in schools, pa-
rental background adjustment is needed to tighten the upper bound
on school effects. On the other hand, it is not so obvious that disad-
vantaged families sort into disadvantaged schools, as the allocation of
school resources tends to favour schools with children in need of
special treatment. Unfortunately, data on primary school attendance
are not available for children born before 1960.
2. Data and school institutions
2.1. Families, neighbourhoods and school mates
The data set has been put together from sources provided by Statis-
tics Norway (Møen, Salvanes, and Sørensen, 2003). The data include
linked administrative data covering most of the Norwegian residents.
We also have national censuses for 1960 and 1970 (Vassenden, 1987).
Using a unique personal identifier given to all Norwegian residents by
the national population register, we can link records from these data
sets. We use a set of household and census tract identifiers in the cen-
sus to identify families and place of residence during childhood. For
the 1959-1970 birth cohorts, we have added which primary school
they graduated from. The censuses also contain family background
variables such as parents' education. The administrative register con-
tains information on adult taxable income (excluding capital gains)
and educational attainment. The linking of administrative to census
data is not perfect, but for the subset of individuals we consider in
this paper, more than 90 per cent can be linked across these datasets
for the older cohorts, while the degree of linking is close to 100 per
cent for younger non-immigrants. The main reason for non-linking is
that the central register of residents based its first records on the cen-
sus of 1960, and among those who left home before 1960, little was
done to refine the information on parents. We have to drop some
additional individuals with incomplete information on residence. Vas-
senden (1987) documents the construction and linking of the census
files, while Statistics Norway (2001) documents the central register of
education.
Neighbourhood is defined as census tract in 1960 or 1970. The total
number of tracts increased from 7996 in 1960 to 8818 in 1970, with
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most of the increase in urban areas. The average tract populations
were 464 and 439 respectively, and these tracts were considerably
smaller than those of most other country censuses of the time (Lan-
gen, 1975). With the single-year cohorts we use, the average number
of individuals ("neighbours") per neighbourhood on which we have
information varies from 6.1 to 8.4, with median neighbourhoods of 4
and 5 individuals.
School mates are individuals who graduated from the same school
when leaving compulsory education (age 15/16 typically). The schools
are larger than the neighbourhoods, with average cohorts of 62 stu-
dents (median 49) in the 1959 cohort, with a trend toward smaller
schools; in the latest cohort for which we have a full year, 1969, the
mean graduating class has 55 students (median 41).1
We observe the neighbourhood in which children live at one point
in time. Because families move, the neighbourhood at a single point
in time may not accurately represent the environment children grew
up in. On the other hand, people may move between very similar
neighbourhoods. In a previous paper (Raaum, Salvanes and Sørensen,
2001), we examined the differential outcomes among those who
stayed and those who changed location between the 1960 and 1970
census (using the list of comparable tract aggregations provided by
Langen, 1975). We found that with respect to neighbour-correlations
in adult educational achievement, this factor does not seem to cause
major biases.
There are 451 municipalities in the 1970 census, and most of these
have at least one school each, only a few have joint schools with
neighbouring municipalities. In 1974,247 municipalities had only one
school, but there are 827 schools in all, which gives an overall average
of 1.96 schools per municipality. Typically, a school district contains a
number of census tracts and, by regulation, a census tract should not
cross school district boundaries although this policy was more strictly
enforced in rural than in urban areas (Byfuglien and Langen, 1983).
Since some time passed between the census of 1970 and our observa-
tions of graduations, which appear from 1974 and onwards, internal
migration makes it difficult to examine the map from census tracts to
school districts in great detail. Noise induced by migration is corre-
lated with the size of the school district, but the median school dis-
7 The 1970 cohort is truncated since we have no information on people born after
the date of the census (November 1,1970).
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trict had, as of 1974, graduates from 15 census tracts, whereas the
25th percentile school district had graduates from 11 tracts and the
75th percentile had 23 tracts represented.
Our measure of adult educational attainment in our main sample is
taken from the register of the level of education maintained by Statis-
tics Norway (Statistics Norway, 2001). This register provides a de-
tailed code of the highest completed education, the completion date
and to how many years of schooling the highest completed education
corresponds. For individuals with no recent education, their level of
education as of the 1970 census is recorded.
Information on the educational attainment of parents is different.
The 1960 census data on parents contain only categorical coding of
types of education. We have transformed the categorical education
codes into years of education, using a two-step procedure. A first step
maps 1960 census codes to 1970 census codes, using repeated obser-
vations of the same individuals in the two censuses. A second step
maps 1970 codes into years of schooling, using the oldest observa-
tions in the central register of education. See Raaum, Salvanes and
Sørensen (2001) for the details of this procedure.
2.2. The Norwegian mandatory school reform in the 1960s
In 1959, the Norwegian Parliament passed a law on mandatory
schooling and the new compulsory 9 years of schooling were gradu-
ally implemented across the country over the years 1960 to 1972. This
school reform extended the number of compulsory years of schooling
from 7 to 9, keeping the school-starting age constant at 7. It also uni-
fied the education system beyond the age of 15/16. Before the re-
form, two years of junior high school preparing for senior high school
were possible to obtain in some municipalities, but pupils in other
areas had to move to another municipality to attend post-compulsory
schools. The nine years in the new system were divided into two lev-
els; first six years of primary school, then three years of lower secon-
dary school which prepared for high school. Hence, for more than a
decade, the Norwegian compulsory school was divided into two sepa-
rate systems. The first cohort that was involved in the reform was the
one born in 1947 and the last cohort that went through the old sys-
tem was born in 1959.
The aims of the reform, explicitly stated in several governmental
papers, were to increase the minimum level of educational attainment
by extending the number of years of compulsory education, to
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smooth the transition to higher education, and finally to enhance
equality of opportunities, both along the socio-economic and the
geographical dimension.
Implementation process of the reform
Under the law of 1959 for mandatory schooling, each municipality
was invited to apply to a committee under the Ministry of Education
to implement the reformed school system for the whole municipality.
This application should include a plan for the new school in terms of
buildings and funding, although the extra costs of teachers and build-
ings were provided by the state. The criteria for being selected among
the applicants by the committee are not clear. However, the commit-
tee wanted to cover different types of communities, making the sam-
ple of implementing municipalities representative for the country and
also the plans for buildings, teaching resources etc should be accept-
able (felhaug, 1969; Mediås, 2000).
We are assessing changes in neighbourhood effects (a relative
measure) and not levels of education. Thus, we are less vulnerable to
the problem of whether reform adoption was random in terms of
school participation above the mandatory years of education. How-
ever, the question that is of course of interest also in our case is
whether municipalities that have implemented the new system, at any
given time (or for any given birth cohort), do not vary systematically
from those who still kept the old school with 7 years of compulsory
schooling. When comparing municipalities by reform status, system-
atic unobserved heterogeneity may bias our results. For instance, did
the richest municipalities implement the reform first? Was it the cit-
ies? Or did municipals in poor rural areas implement the reform first
since there were obvious economic incentives for implementing the
reform? In the public debate from the 1950s and 1960s, it was
claimed that the old educational system with more streaming, pre-
pared better for high school and university studies than the new sys-
tem, indicating that the rich and city areas perhaps implemented the
reform late. Itwas also claimed in the public debate at the time that 9
years of mandatory schooling were not necessary in many rural com-
munities, since fishing and farming were the main industries and
those did not require 9 years or higher education.
We are not checking these hypotheses carefully in this paper, only
presenting some indication of a possible relationship between the av-
erage years of parental schooling, by the birth cohort of their child
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and the reform status displayed in Figure 1. The figure suggests that
the unconditional transition (probability) was positively correlated
with the educational attainment of the parents. In Aakvik, Salvanes
and Vaage (2003), a detailed analysis of the process of allocating the
reforms to municipalities is undertaken. As indicated from Figure 1,
the case is not completely clear, but a more detailed analysis did not
find support for a systematic allocation of the reform to municipali-
ties.
Figure 1. Parental years of education
(by primary school reform status and birth cohort)
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1955 1960
-+-- Mothers'education, no reform - - Mothers'education, reform
......... Fathers' education, no reform - Fathers' education, reform
Identification of reform status
Information on what type of primary school people attended is only
available for those who never continued schooling above the manda-
tory years, so it is necessary to classify the type of primary education
based on municipality of residence in the censuses of 1960 and 1970.
It is, however, not an easy task to find municipality level information
on reform implementation. The most authoritative list is Ness (1971),
but this list is organized by municipalities in 1970. A series of munici-
pality mergers and boundary adjustments in 1965-66 make it difficult
to fix a point in time for the reform based on 1960 municipality for
the later part of the 1960s. We want to concentrate on finding a date
of implementation using the 1960 municipalities; since a 1970 mu-
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nicipality can include several 1960 municipalities with different dates
of implementation and thus, it is more difficult to fix a unique imple-
mentation year for the 1970 municipalities.
We use a classification scheme based on administrative data on
adult educational achievement, focusing on those who left school
with only primary education, let us call these people the "dropouts".
For each 1960 municipality, we follow the cohorts of those who lived
there at the time of the 1960 census. For each year, we calculate the
share of dropouts from the old system and the share of dropouts
from the new system. We use these dropout rates to calculate two
candidate measures of reform date: The first when the dropouts from
the old system stop appearing, and the second when the dropouts
from the new system start showing up.
Since we must allow for same migration, we cannot simply use
indicators of whether there are any dropouts at all as measures of
school type. Such a scheme would be much too sensitive to internal
migration of even a single individual who moved and dropped out in
a municipality with a different implementation date than the one he
left. This problem would be particularly important for dating the re-
form in the larger municipalities, since they receive the large number
of migrants. In order to get around this, we need to measure the
number of dropouts relative to the population of potential dropouts,
and we need to set a positive cut-off rate to allow for some measure-
ment error. We also want to avoid that this measurement error is sys-
tematically related to the schooling pattern in the municipalities, so we
cannot use a uniform cut-off rate across all municipalities. Instead, we
calculate municipality-specific "normal rates" of dropout based on the
dropout rates of the 1946-1948 cohorts, which were not exposed to
the reform. When the dropout rate from the old system falls below 50
per cent of this "normal" rate, we have the first candidate date of the
implementation of the reform. Similarly, we calculate such normal
dropout rates from the new system using the 1957-1959 cohorts
which we know with certainty went through the new system. The year
the rate of dropouts from the new system reaches 50 per cent of this
second normal rate is our second candidate date of reform implemen-
tation.
When the two candidate measures agree on what year the reform
was implemented, we use this as the year of implementation. Should
there be a gap of one or two years between the two candidate meas-
ures, such that it would seem that the old system closed before the
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newone opened, we use the second candidate measure since this is
most resistant to a secular decrease in the dropout rate. Should there
instead be an overlap of one year between the two candidate meas-
ures, such that it seems that the old system and the new system coex-
isted for a year, we tried to check all larger municipalities (with more
than 100 students) against the list in Ness (1971) and local informants.
For smaller municipalities with one-year overlaps, we have randomly
assigned one of the candidate years. The remaining municipalities, for
which none of these methods worked, have been dropped from the
sample. While there will certainly be some measurement error in our
reform date taken as a flow indicator, we believe that the measure-
ment error in the stock of reformed and non-reformed municipalities
for a given year is small.
This method provides a year of implementation for 545 out of 728
municipalities. Table 1 displays the relative importance of the various
rules in assigning an implementation date. The slow and gradual im-
plementation of the reform is illustrated in Figure 2. Table A4 in the
Appendix presents descriptive statistics for the included and non-
included neighbourhoods. As we can see, there is very little differ-
ence. In our analysis below, we only consider birth cohorts where the
smallest of the reformed and non-reformed group constitute at least 5
per cent of the students, and we therefore exclude the 1946-1947 and
the 1957-1959 cohorts.
Table 1. Procedures of reform year identification
Share of Share
~~_,_0~~__,,0__~, 0000'_~__ 0 omu~io~Jp-alities ()J~P~
The two indicators coincide .398 .555-~~~Y-!l.!.Ul~i====_=o=-::'-=-_::-=-=J~_~"_~_~_=-==~!25 __
Tw()..:Y.~r..9!P_...._. ._. _....:Q_~ ._..... .042
Manual inspection .029 .078
Ral'!dom ~si9nmen!__~" .116 0..::..=0.:...7...:..1_
_olJndecided, not~_ed .255 ._12_9__
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Figure 2. Accumulated shares of after-reform municipalities
and pupils
~'"iii'
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___...._ Pupils ---- MuniCipalities
3. Results
Neighbour and school-mate correlations are estimated using the full
list of all unique pairs within neighbourhoods or schools that are not
also siblings; see Solon et al. (2000). Correlations are reported sepa-
rately for each birth year, in order to distinguish between neighbour-
hoods located in pre- and post-reform municipalities. If we expanded
the number of birth cohorts, each neighbourhood would consist of
children who went to different school systems. One might argue that
children are affected by the attitudes and behaviour among older
peers and not only by those of equal age. However, those born in the
same year would be exposed to the same environment, e.g. have the
same older role models. Detailed results are reported in Appendix
Tables A1-A3.
3.1. Trend in the effects of childhood neighbourhood and paren-
tal education
Figure 3 displays the correlations in educational attainment among
neighbouring children by birth cohort.f The neighbourhoods of the
8 The standard errors are not displayed, but they are very small and vary around
.006, see the Appendix.
157
57
THE IMPACT OF A PRIMARY SCHOOL REFORM ON EDUCATIONAL
STRATIFICATION, Oddbjørn Raaum, Kjell G. Salvanes and Erik ø. Sørensen
1947-1958 cohorts are defined by the 1960 census, while the 1970
census defines the neighbourhoods for the 1955-1970 cohorts. The
fIgure also includes the family background adjusted correlations
which subtract the covariance component arising from sorting on ob-
served family characteristics (i.e. parental education). The correlations
are substantial, around .1, for the cohorts born in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. There is a clear trend of declining correlations until
around the 1962 cohort, but from then onwards, the correlations are
basically constant at a level of about .025. Since the estimates using
the two alternative neighbourhood definitions for the "overlapping"
birth cohorts, 1955-58, are basically the same, the lower correlations
in the 1960 cohorts cannot simply reflect a change in the definition of
neighbourhoods.
Figure 3. Neighbour correlations by birth cohort
............... ....." ...... ..._ ....
.. ... -c , ~, ....... "" ••••••••• "', ••••••••••
-' , .... "' ...... ...._.. .....~~ ...........o ~------~------~------~------~~----r
1945 1950 1955 1960
Birth cohort
1965 1970
--+-- Neighbour correlations 1960 - - - - Neighbour correlations 1960, adjusted
........ Neighbour correlations 1970 -_ Neighbour correlations 1970, adjusted
Apparently, correlations in Figure 3 are small and some may find
them negligible. However, if we convert a correlation estimate of .1
into "level effects" in years of schooling, we get a standard deviation
of neighbourhood effects which amounts to about .95 years." A cor-
relation of .03 corresponds to a standard deviation of ,5 years of
schooling. Consequently, even seemingly negligible correlations are
non-trivial, For comparison, a correlation of .4, which is the typical
9 By rearranging (3) and using the observed standard deviation in schooling, which
is about 3.
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number for Norwegian siblings, corresponds to a standard deviation
of effects of 1.9 years of schooling.
Figure 3 also reveals that family sorting matters. In order to adjust
for parental education, we regress educational attainment on school-
ing years of the father and mother and neighbourhood dummies. Sub-
tracting the covariance of predicted family effects from the total co-
variance and dividing by the total variance of educational attainment,
we get the adjusted neighbour correlations. When correlations are ad-
justed for parental education, the estimates are reduced by more than
fifty percent. While the neighbour correlations for the cohorts in the
late 1940s and early 1950s remain significant, at around .04, they drop
steadily over time and are close to zero from the 1960-cohorts on-
wards. As even the family adjusted correlations can be seen as upper
bounds on the neighbourhood effects, we conclude that the impact of
childhood community on adult educational attainment is negligible
for Norwegians who are today in their thirties and early forties.
The declining neighbourhood effects may reflect that sorting on
unobserved family characteristics has become less severe over time.
This explanation can be checked by looking at how adult education is
distributed within and between neighbourhoods over time, since we
expect the sorting on the basis of parental education to be the same as
that on unobserved characteristics. Table 2 is taken from Raaum, Sal-
vanes and Sørensen (2001) and shows that the between-
neighbourhood component has become more important over time,
indicating that sorting has been more, rather than less, severe.
Table 2. Degree of neighbourhood sorting
Mother's education Father's education_____.._n·"_.._ ...__.._. .·.~.._.~ ··
1945-55 1955-65 1945-55 1955-65_._~~~-,._--"---_._---,._----_ ..---_._----_."._-~._._.---_ .._--~------"._-""'------_.
mean 8.005 8.678 8.771 9.503
_______ . ·._. ._··_'._ •• w .•·._.·_·_· •·_.,, • ••• _. ._.~ .'". ._. _
.611 .846 .780 1.314
Note: The decomposition of the variance of parental schooling. Estimates from the
fixed effect regression Eu = Ef + u, + ei' (neighbourhood fixed effects). Sample is
restricted to parents aged 30-50 at the time of the censuses. This table is taken from
Raaum, Salvanes and Sørensen (2001).
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The family adjustment is based on cohort-specific estimates of the
relation between the schooling years of parents' and children. Figure 4
displays the estimated regression coefficient of the schooling years of
the mother and father. An interaction term turns out negative and the
coefficients are evaluated at the mean for fathers and mothers. Two
striking results appear. First, there is a clear trend of declining relation
between educational attainment of parents and child, suggesting that
intergenerational educational mobility has increased, in accordance
with Bratberg, Nilsen and Vaage (2002). Second, the "effect" of the
mother's education seems to be the stronger.
Figure 4. Effects of parental education on children's
schooling (by birth cohort)
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3.2. Neighbour correlations by primary school reform status
For each of the 1948-1956 birth cohorts, we classify individuals as
"before- or after-reform" according to the reform-status of the mu-
nicipality in which their neighbourhood is located. Neighbour correla-
tions are then estimated separately by cohort and reform status. This
exercise is motivated by the pattern of declining neighbour correla-
tions; if the primary school reform lowered the impact of childhood
location, we expect to find a lower correlation among neighbouring
children who went to the new school system. Consequently, as more
children were entering the new school, the overall neighbour correla-
tion would drop as a result of the reform.
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The neighbour correlations are displayed in the left panel in Figure
5, while the family adjusted estimates are shown in the right panel.
First, looking at the left panel, we see that the after-reform correla-
tions are alllower than the before-reform correlations during the first
seven years (incl. the 1953 cohort). By 1953, about 50 per cent of the
cohort lived in municipalities which had implemented the new school
system. Thereafter, the correlations of two groups are basically the
same. We also see that the trend of declining correlations, with the
exception of the 1953-cohort, remains when we consider the before-
reform neighbourhoods. No such trend is found for the after-reform
individuals.
Second, the right panel shows that the difference according to re-
form status drops significantly when we adjust for parental education.
Although the estimated neighbour correlations are higher in the be-
fore-reform municipalities in seven of nine cases, there is no clear pat-
tern. There is a tendency to lower post-reform correlations in munici-
palities with an early implementation. This is restricted to the 1947-
1951 cohorts and the fraction of pupils in the new school is less than
25 per cent in these cohorts. At most, the primary school reform im-
plemented throughout the 1960s had a modest impact on the overall
trend of declining neighbourhood effects.
Figure 5. Neighbour correlations
(by primary school reform status and birth cohort)
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3.3. School mate correlations
A lower secondary school identifier is available from 1974 onwards,
enabling us to construct school mates defined as children born be-
tween 1959 and 1970 who graduated from the same school around
the age of 15/16. All went to the new system with nine years of com-
pulsory schooling. Figure 6 displays correlations in years of schooling
among school mates, by birth cohort. The upper line shows the unad-
justed correlations and we recognize the pattern of declining correla-
tions found among neighbouring children in the pre-1962 cohorts.
We note, however, that the school mate correlations are significantly
lower than the corresponding neighbour correlations.
Figure 6. School mate correlations (by birth cohort)
--- ." ......... - .......... _- ... ---
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- - School mate correlations- - - - School mate correlations (family adjusted)
Again, we expect that the sorting of families into local communi-
ties and school areas will give a positive bias in the estimates of over-
all school effects. The family adjusted school mate correlations are
significantly lower and even close to zero. Thus, we find a negligible
impact of factors shared by children who graduated from the same
school at the age of 15/16. In other words, the variation in "school
quality" and the magnitude of peer-effects seem to be very small. This
is consistent with the negligible neighbour correlations of the same
cohorts, and also the low levels of "between-school" variance typi-
cally found in studies of student performance distributions (Coleman,
1966; OECD, 2003). One caveat needs to be emphasized. The inter-
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pretation of a family adjusted school mate correlation as an upper
bound on the school effects is based on the assumption that children
of "advantaged" families go to "good schools", i.e.
cov(P ,Z c ' a 'X fe) ~ O. Since school resources are partly distributed in
a compensating way, which provides extra resources to schools teach-
ing pupils with specific needs, this assumption may not hold. On the
other hand, our family background adjustment is unlikely to account
for the total impact of clustering of similar families in schools.
4. Conclusions
This paper has studied the composite effect of primary schools and
neighbourhoods on adult educational attainment in Norway, with a
particular emphasis on changes over time. We focus on correlations
in the final years of schooling among neighbouring children as well as
school mates. These correlations measure the proportion of the vari-
ance in years of schooling, explained by factors shared by individuals
who grew up in the same local community or graduated from the
same school at the age 15/16. We do not identify the effects of speCIfic
neighbourhood and school characteristics, but the correlations meas-
ure the relative importance of childhood neighbourhood and school.
As such, the measures are closely linked to "inequality of opportu-
nity", where the location of your parents' home affects your adult
outcome.
The impact of neighbourhoods on educational attainment has di-
minished, in accordance with Raaum, Salvanes and Sørensen (2001).
Estimating neighbourhood effects for all birth cohorts from the late
1947 to 1970, we find a clear trend of declining correlations until
around the 1962 cohort. From then onwards, the correlations are ba-
sically constant and close to zero when we adjust for family sorting
into local communities.
We single out the primary school reform gradually introduced dur-
ing the 1960s as a potential explanation, because primary schools con-
stitute an important part of the neighbourhoods. The reform ex-
tended compulsory schooling from 7 to 9 years, provided a common
curriculum for all schools and was aimed at equalizing opportunities
across socio-economic and geographical backgrounds. For each of
the 1947-1956 birth cohorts, we classify individuals as "before- or
after-reform", according to the reform-status of the neighbourhood.
The estimated neighbour correlations tend to be higher in the before-
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reform municipalities, but the difference is reduced when we adjust
for parental education. The primary school reform implemented
throughout the 1960s cannot fully explain the trend of declining
neighbourhood effects in Norway.
Finally, we estimate school mate correlations for children bom be-
tween 1959 and 1970, looking for the impact of factors shared by
children who graduated from the same school at the age 15/16. Ef-
fects of school resources and organizational practices, peer effects
within schools and local communities are included in this measure.
Accounting for family sorting, the school mate correlations are close
to zero. Thus, the variation in "school quality" and the impact of
peers on final educational attainment seem to have been very limited
in Norway, consistent with the negligible neighbour correlations
found for the same cohorts.
Focusing on Norwegians presently in their thirties and early for-
ties, their childhood neighbourhood and primary school have had a
negligible impact on their educational attainment. Since significant
neighbourhood effects are found for those who are ten years older, it
seems likely that policy changes have been effective in levelling the
playing field across local communities. Even if the effects of the pri-
mary school reform are found to be limited, we believe that redis-
tributive policies equalizing spending across municipalities and other
educational reforms are likely explanations.
Family background, however, remains an important determinant
of educational attainment. The evidence on how family effects have
changed over time is mixed. Apparently, the declining relation be-
tween educational attainment of children and parents, as well the drop
in neighbourhood effects, are both at odds with the stable sibling cor-
relations found in Raaum, Salvanes and Sørensen (2001). As
neighbourhood and parental education represent factors typically
shared by siblings, we would expect sibling correlations to fall as well.
However, alternative measures of intergenerational mobility do not
necessarily change in the same direction. Sibling correlations are af-
fected by intra-family resemblance as well as inter-family differences.
Imagine that educational reforms induce all "talented" children from
"disadvantaged" families (where "talent" is shared by siblings), to
continue school and enter higher education. If parental resources only
allowed one of the children to enter university in the earlier cohorts,
the reforms would reduce intra-family differences which would con-
tribute to a higher resemblance in educational attainment among sib-
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lings. This example illustrates the possibility that intra-family resem-
blance is strengthened, while differences between families are re-
duced.
In the Nordic countries, access to rich administrative and census
data has opened up during the last five to ten years. Matched data on
individuals, families, schools and neighbourhoods facilitate new ap-
proaches in future studies trying to disentangle the effects of these
factors. Good data help considerably, but the real challenge is to es-
tablish a framework which enables us to identify behaviour as well as
responses to policy changes.
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Appendix
The correlation estimator is described in Solon et al. (2000). Each
neighbourhood or school-mate group consists of many pairs of indi-
viduals. Earlier research has indicated that the weighting strategy is
not critical, so all these pairs are weighted equally and an ordinary cor-
relation is calculated on this expanded dataset. For calculation of the
standard errors, we have used a bootstrap estimator, re-sampling with
municipalities as the clustering unit and 300 replications.
Table A1. Trend in neighbour correlations
Birth Co- 1960 neighbourhoods 1970 neighbourhoods
hort"---,---'~------_._._'------'---'----------------
Unadjusted Family ad- Unadjusted Family ad-
...._... .._ . justed justed
1947 ,11~J(,0?~~1 .0.§7~(·OJO~1
_1948 . JOO~_{.0179) ..0438(.0056)_. . _
j 949 o :9_924(.0144)._.0392lQQ_~_.
1950 .0918(.0170) ,035?CQQ4:3)
1_~pJ.__._.. _ _'0853LQ__!§~ __·0314L004J) __ . .._._._. _
_1g§_?_. _.QZ1:3_(.010~L_,g_1JE_{_._Q9~_ ... _ .. ._ .. ._.
1953 .0813(.0159) .0257(.0043)
1954 _.__ ,QZ31L9_1?~1_ :Q1~~LQ_O_:3?L ... _ _ __ ._ . .
.1955 __ ._ ,Q_§_~~CQ_084L__'__0140L003Q} ..:9.§:34LQQ_66L.,__0_??_Q_(.0042).__
1956 .0554(.0068) .0112(.003~) .0498(.0073) .0187(.0033)
1957 ._.0673(,Q9J3§) _. 021p.CQQ:341 __,O.p4?C9913_91. .01_1}LQ_Q:3~)_...
.1958 __ ._._.:.Q§?1(.00~)_.:.99~~LQ9_§_§L_:Q_4.~§_L9_Q~~L_·018~LQ037L_
1959 ..... _ .__ .. __._._ .. ... _...,9460(J106~1_ __.Q_1_l_:3_(_.QQ_3_§L
1960 .0321{.0059) .. 0074(.0034)
1~~....__. . ... ._.. . . ·Q:3.:3?t 0037LÆ.??'{· OO_:3_I3L_
_:1~_13?.. _. . _.__.... _. .. __ .Q.185(.0027) __:QQ1.?_{J193~L.
1963 .0175(.0039) .9036(.003~)
1964 ._._ .. .0177(.0029) .005~(0035) _
_19~.§._ . .. _ .. ___.__0229(.0029) .012§_{.0034L.
1966 .0106(.0925) .QQ08LOO?(3)
1967 ..._ .._. .0141(.0025) .0055(.0025)
1.968__ .._. ... .. _.... __.__... 0177(.002ZL .0080(.0025L_
1969 .Q166('9Q?9) .0070(.OQ2?)
197_Q_ ...._..._.__.. .. .0181 (.0042) .0066LQ03ZL_
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Table A2. Neighbour correlations by reform status
Birth Post-reformneighbour- Pre-reform neighbourhoods
cohort hoods
Unadjusted Family ad- Unadjusted Familyad-
... o_~~_oo_. .o.o._j~_~~_ ~o_.. _o O_o_... 0.___lusted ._
J ~40~. o o·Q114LQJ_2.11_ j)2?~L91 O1L.__.1 05~tQ1~.ElL .. 048QLQQElElL
o19.4.~._0._o_.&!?L4.(·0145J_.oJ)~98(.014ZL __,Q~59LQJ§QL ..:.Q~4t004~} ..
1950 ,0343(,9094) .. 0058(.0998) .0100(.0162) .0400(.0041)
1~?:!__ __-,-Q_~§_(,Q054) _o,O1Q?i 0063) _o ·O~~~L.0J64) .___.Q~~ZtOO~~L
.1Jl_§_2... __ ... ,0480(.09?o~L ,Q?67J~Q9.2_§)._:Q812LQ1.El~L .0175(.0041l.
1953 .0~Z~(.0054) .0162(.0045) .. O~~?(.0169) .0320(.0068)
01.95_4.~__ 00:9_§86(.0127L.:01 ~2(.00310L __:_Q_623L021.~l .0139(.OQEl~L
_1_~5_?.__ ._.057Z_lQQ~?Lo __·Q15ZtQ02ZL__.0531LQ14Ell.. .02~_LQ_QZZL
1956 .0507(.0072) .0092(.0036) .0562(.0101) .0478(.0089)
Table A3. School mate correlations
._~.!.~!:!...~ohort . Un.!'_C!i~!!ed Fami!y-adjus!.~_._
_195~_ .~_~ o .0313 (.0063L o:0067(.0029) __ 0
_J~oEl_Q__ ._o _.Q~~LOO.44Loo_~ __:9043(.003~ _
_Jo~El1o.oo o_~ .m.·02?~L.QQ_~L.o __ .---.:.9023(. 003.?.L. __ ._.
o1~~?_. . ... . . _ Jl1ElZLQ_Q~__ ~ 0.0 ::9_QQQLQQ~§Lo __
. 1~6? . ,91?§CQQ.?9L '0 .00 :·900~L99~~L. o
o"~o~§.4o ... m____ _,9~1.?_[LQ9J?1__..... _. ..:.QO.~~(..QQ~}L. 0 __ 0
1~§_? . o. . __ o . :9Jo~fQQ1§Lo _ ~QQ?~tQQ?~L _
_1~§0 .'. . 00 ~o 00_ ,Q124LQQ10?J o . __ .'.90~1LQQ??)o _
.Jo~o§L .._..._ .. m.. m.'o o__,Q.14?LQ9Jo~lo 00' o ..cQQ54_(:00204L..__
1.9.§~ .0 o... o o 00 :9_1~ElLQQ17) ...o o' . . ·QQ~ZLQQ.?ZL__
o_1.§}_t3_~ 0_ mo : O13_4LOO1.~Lo._. . o ,QQ~2.('OQ_~ ..
_1_~Z.0_o.... 0 •• __ o__ ~_ .0131 LQQ1_~L__o _ .._:Q034LQQ?~L_. __
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Table A4. Descriptive statistics and neighbour correlations for
neighbourhoods that were matched and not matched in the
pre- and post-reform analysis
Co-
hort
Average Average
education education
Matched No match
Share
Matched
pupils
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Abstract
Universal pension plans and large public-sector workforces affect ac-
cumulation and allocation of human capital. The benefit reforms and re-
training programs being considered in many countries are likely to affect
behaviour in ways that can only be analysed within forward-looking mod-
els of lifetime labour supply. Using Norwegian panel data on three birth
cohorts, this paper develops and estimate a life-cycle model of public- and
private-sector employment. The model of sequential career-choices builds
on Keane and Wolpin (1997), extending the accumulation of skills to be
sector-specific and allowing unobserved, non-deterministic depreciation of
skills. The Norwegian retirement benefits are modelled in a way that builds
on the discretisation approach of Rust and Phelan (1997), and identifica-
tion is aided by exploiting how current career-choices affect future expected
benefits. I find important heterogeneity in skill accumulation. The model
is used to analyse the effect of a pension reform on sector-specific labour
supply. The reform has large effects on labour supply, but the sectoral
effects are small.
1 Introduction
This paper constructs a model of life-cycle labour supply in which individuals
accumulate sector-specific skills by attending school or gaining work experience,
and in which individuals run the risk of losing skills that are not used. This allows
'Department of Economics NHH, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, erik. scr'ensenånhh .no. I
am grateful for encouragement and very helpful advice from Christopher Ferrall and Kjell G.
Salvanes. I have also received helpful comments from Anne M. Danø,
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individuals to endogenously specialise in one of the two sectors, with an expected
cost of switching sectors that depends on the skill technology and on the career
history. I estimate this modelon a panel of three Norwegian birth-cohorts, us-
ing the incentives of sector-specific retirement benefits to aid identification. This
framework allows evaluation of pension reforms and adult education initiatives.
These policies are under consideration in a number of countries as welfare states
prepare for ageing populations and react to increasing public pressure to mod-
ernise and downsize their public sectors.
Preparing for demographic changes about to come, universal pension plans
financed out of current taxation has been the target of reform plans in most
developed countries. Such reforms will have consequences for more than gov-
ernment budgets; implicit claims on future benefits constitute a large fraction of
households net wealth (Domeij and Klein 2002) and have been claimed to have
important effects on life-cycle labour supply (Rust 2001). In addition to the uni-
versal plans, large public sector workforces have often accepted generous future
supplementary benefits in exchange for a lower level of current earnings. Changes
to the universal plans will interact with the public sector supplementary benefits
and could have large effects on recruitment to the public sector and labour mo-
bility between the public and the private sector. Quantification of these effects
can only be made within a life-cycle model of labour supply.
This paper follows Keane and Wolpin (1997) in modelling the occupational
choice problem as a net present value maximisation, with the decision to work
being discrete. Individuals take into account the effect current career choices
have on future retirement benefits. The paper departs from the baseline model of
Keane and Wolpin in making the occupational choice one between the public and
private sector rather than a choice between blue-collarjwhite-collar and military
employment. This is motivated by the attempt to analyse policies directed at
the public sector employment and benefit reforms, but also by the fact that the
public workforce accounts for a large proportion of total employment in most
European welfare states. In Norway it accounts for as much as 33% of employ-
ment in 2000 (Statistics Norway 2001, Table 244). There is also evidence that
wage-education profiles are different in the public and private sector in Norway
even after controlling for a large number of other factors (Hægeland, Klette and
Salvanes 1999).
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The paper shares the goal of Rust and Phelan (1997) of modelling the effect
of retirement benefits on behaviour. It also borrows some of the methodology of
modelling the dynamics as controlled Markov processes on rather course grids.
The state-space can be factored such that some of these Markov processes can
be pre-estimated. It differs from Rust and Phelan (1997) in having an explicit
model of how skills accumulate and in including career-choices over the full life-
cycle: formal schooling and National Service, accumulation of work-experience
and retirement at old age.l A benefit of this is that a wider range of policies
can be studied.P The model is to integrate out the effect of past choices on
the distribution of unobservables, such that it is not necessary to make the re-
strictive assumption that all non-transient state-variables can be observed by the
econometrician.
The three birth-cohorts of Norwegian males I use span the life-cycle, and
following Lee (2005) I use the stochastic structure of the model to integrate
out over the unobservables for time that pass before the cohorts under study
reaches the window of observation (1986-2000). Observers have claimed that the
incentives introduced by the public sector supplementary benefit schemes have
the effect of locking people into the public sector when they reach middle age.
This difference in retirement benefits between the two sectors provides exogenous
variation in incentives that helps identify the model.
The pension system in Norway has two main parts. There is an universal
scheme, the "National Insurance" (Folketrygden, somewhat resembling the US
Social Security), and there are supplimentary systems provided by contracting
between employers and employees. The National Insurance is a strongly redis-
tributive program, financed by pay-as-you-go taxation. Even those who have
never worked, and therefore not contributed to the pension fund, are entitled to
a basic pension and a special supplement guaranteeing a yearly minimum income
of about USD 11,000 with little taxation applied. Even above this, the accu-
mulation of claims to future benefits is highly non-actuarial. Employers provide
additional supplementary pension schemes. Only the private sector supplement-
1Former studies of the Norwegian pension benefits schemes have focused either on forecasting
effects of changes in the fine structure of early retirement schemes, and have not modelled the full
life-cycle. See for instance Hernæs, Sollie and Strøm (2000); Bratberg, Holmås and Thøgersen
(2001); Brinch, Hernaes and Strøm (2001); Jia (2005).
2The present paper concentrates on reform of the retirement benefits but future work will
look at other issues.
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ary schemes are approximately actuarial. The public sector schemes are financed
by all public employees at a rate of 2% of gross earnings, and the benefits offers
a defined benefit level after consolidation with the National Insurance. This con-
solidation implies that people with low incomes, little public-sector experience
and part-time workers subsidise the pensions of high-wage full-time employees
who stay on in the public sector throughout their career. The benefit level is
calculated from experience and the final salary. Going to one public sector em-
ployer to another does not interfere with the public sector insurance schemes, one
is seamlessly transferred to the scheme of the new public employer as if all past
public-sector contributions were to the last employer's fund. This provided the
rationale for standardisation of public sector pension schemes (Norges offentlige
utredninger 2000).
In Section 2 I present a model of sectoral choice and retirement in an en-
vironment where there is no aggregate uncertainty but where there are idiosyn-
cratic shocks to earnings and human capital accumulation. The following sections
present the data, explain how the model is estimated, the structural estimates and
a policy experiments. An appendix provides additional details about the Norwe-
gian retirement benefit system with some excessive detail, to make it possible to
evaluate the relevance of the incentives embedded in the present model.
2 Modelling career choices
The fulllevel of detail in the Norwegian system is impossible to embed in an em-
pirical model of optimising individuals. I work with the simplifying assumption of
no aggregate uncertainty, and abstract from the consolidation of married couples
pensions. I do this by modelling the incentives for single men only, and apply
these rules to men irrespective of their marital status. Since men tend to be older
than their wives, have more work experience and higher wages, this is probably
a reasonable first approximation to the marginal pension benefits. Modelling the
interactions of spousal choices at the level of detail needed to model responses to
policy changes in retirement benefits is currently not a tractable problem in life-
cycle models, where households cannot be taken as stable (although important
progress has been made by van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005)). In the model,
individuals have perfect foresight about changes to the benefit schemes.
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I also attempt to produce the simplest possible model that can retain some of
the incentives in human capital and pension benefits accumulation. This means
that all variables will take on a discrete number of values, and many of them will
be binary. Whereas it has been shown that complicated models can be estimated
when appropriate approximations are made (French 2005; van der Klaauw and
Wolpin 2005), this typically depends on the limiting restrictions of all unobserv-
able variables having no history-dependence, and a strongly restricted structure
on the unobserved permanent heterogeneity. I formulate a simple model, but one
that allows for both unobserved differences in skill-technology and incomplete ob-
servation of the relevant state of individuals. The choices are, as in the baseline
human capital papers, made to maximise the net present value of the future in-
come stream. Hence there is no insurance motive to the retirement benefits in
the model.
2.1 States and choices
Time is characterised by two indices, t index the age of the individual, t E
{O,... ,T}. To allow for more than one cohort when government policy and
skill prices change over time, there is also an index d E D that index different
demographic groups, generations, that face different policy trajectories. Together,
d and t determine the calendar year. The state of an individual, denoted bye, is
(1)
I use a to denote the choice taken, hence at-l is the choice taken in the previous
period. The "elig" variables index eligibility for National Service and early re-
tirement. Experience, æ == (Xl, X, XN1), consists of three variables that represents
experience in the public sector, Xl, total experience, x, and experience within
the National Insurance system XN1 (needed to model those who started work-
ing before National Insurance was introduced). The capital within the National
Insurance system is kept track of in pp!, the final pension point score. Sector
specific skills are held in 8 == (Sl, S2). The productivity in home production is
U4, and Cw == (cl, £'2) is the realisation from the conditional wage distribution.
While not relevant for individual choice, edUt E {O,... , 9}, counts past years of
education over and above mandatory education (9 years).
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Table 1: Possible and mutually exclusive actions
a action
1 Work full time in the public sector
2 Work full time in the private sector
3 Go to school
4 household production
5 retirement
I will return to the exact specification of the the states, for now it is sufficient
to note that an action at taken from the finite set A(Bt, t) of possible actions
induce a distribution over next period states Bt+l E S(at, Bt), with probabilities
P (Bt+l lat, Bt, t, d) = Px(æ(Bt+l) lat, æ(Bt), t, d)
. Pppf(ppf(Bt+I)lat, Wat(Bt), ppf(Bt), t, d)· Ps(s(Bt+l)lat, s(Bt))
. Pu4(U4,t+llu4,t) . Pe(cw) . P(Bt). (2)
The experience sub-process depends only on choices and time, the retirement
capital depends on choices, calendar time and the rest of the state only through
the wage earned. The skill process depends only on choices, the productivity
in home production depends only on the current level and the wage shock is
independent of historyand the other state variables.
The action set depends on the state because there are restrictions on when
retirement is allowed, and some further restrictions will be imposed for computa-
tional reasons. There is also the possibility of the government restriction choices
by forced and mandatory drafting into the National Service (I will return to this
in section 3.3). In the first period, individuals are 16 years old and exiting com-
pulsoryeducation. In the last period T, only retirement is allowed and retirement
brings the career to a full stop. The possible actions are enumerated in Table 1.
Experience is sector-specific and acquired by working. In order to limit the
size of the state space, experience is acquired in step intervals of 10 years. In
order to smooth the effect of these jumps, experience is acquired stochastically:
By working one has probability 1/10 of a step increase in experience. Total
experience is bounded at 40 years. The experience vector æ = (Xl, X, xN1) E X
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keeps track of Xl, experience in the public sector and x, total experience, and
x = {(i,j,k): i,j,k E {O,lO,20,30, 40} and i ~j, k ~ j}.
For everyone who entered the labour market after the introduction of the National
Insurance, xN1 == x, and there are only 15 points on the grid in total. For
the cohorts that made their early career choices without an existing National
Insurance system in place, there are more possible points because total experience
can be greater than the National Insurance experience. Limiting attention to
those who entered ten years before 1967, I allow only the attainment of one unit
(10 years) of experience earned before 1967, and this keeps the total number of
experience points down to 29.
People leave compulsory schooling without any specific skills, but can acquire
sector-specific skills by working or attending school. The specific skills take only
two values (high and low), such that s E {O,Sl} x {O,S2}' Production of specific
skills is not deterministic, but attending school there is a probability pj that an
unskilled individual acquires skills. Schooling produces general skills, by which
I mean that public and private sectors skills jump simultaneously. There is a
probability p~ that an unskilled individual working in sector will acquire a unit
of specific skills in that sector and a probability p~ that a skill unit in a sector
will be lost by an individual who does not use it.
The National Insurance administration calculates pension benefits conditional
on a much larger state-space than can possibly be allowed for in a model to be
estimated. The National Insurance keeps track of an "average pension points"
which is the average over the 20 with highest acquired pension points. Pension
points are calculated as a non-linear function of earnings, and the formula for
calculating them has changed over time. Since 1992, for earnings below lGt,
one earns no pension points. For earnings in between lGt and 8Gt, one earns
(y/Gt - 1) pension points, and above 8Gt there is no marginal contribution of
earnings to pension points. Since 1992, the value of Gt is indexed to wages, and
G2000 = 48400, approximately 7500 USD. See the appendix for more details on
how this has been calculated historically.
In order to model the average-of-twenty-best years exactly, one would need to
keep track of an pension point history as a point in lR!o. This is not feasible. The
problem of keeping track of continuous variables can easily be solved by an ap-
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propriate discretisation. Keeping track of how the average over the twenty years
of highest earnings evolve is a more difficult problem, and some approximation
will have to be found. Researchers studying Social Security in the United States
are faced with a similar problem.' French (2005) assumes that above average
earnings always replace an average year after the history is full, while van der
Klaauw and Wolpin (2005) assume that any current earnings always replace an
average year. Since the current average will always be higher than the minimum
of past earnings (the earnings point actually replaced under Social Security reg-
ulation), it would seem that these approaches systematically underestimate the
effect earnings late in the career can have on retirement benefits. Rust and Phelan
(1997) takes a different approach byestimating a reduced form regression where
Social Security Averaged Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) depends on current
earnings, AIME lagged by one period and age.
Since the previous public sector wage can be predicted by the state-space,
I do not track it separately. I follow the method of Rust and Phelan (1997),
but without treating the National Insurance capital as a continuous variable. I
discretise the accumulated pension average into four levels, and estimate reduced
form legit-equations for whether a given earnings level give rise to a jump on
the grid, such that the distribution of next period accumulated pension average
is a continuous function of current earnings. I will return to the details of this
procedure in Section 3.5 after having described the available data.
2.2 Utility of choices
Based on their outcome (Ot, at) individuals receive a per period utility of U(Ot, at):
U(Ot, 1) = (1 - Tdt(Wldt(Ot)) - 0.02)Wldt(Ot) +Ul,
U(Ot,2) = (1 - Tdt(Wldt(Ot)))W2dt(Ot),
U(Ot,3) = U3 - B(at-l =J 3)U3r,
U(Ot,4) = (1+ ~)t-dU4t,
U(Ot, 5) = B(O, t, d).
(3a)
(3b)
(3c)
(3d)
(3e)
3The US Social Security Administration keeps track of 35 years of highest past earnings in
the "Average Indexed Monthly Earnings" .
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Wages are functions of the state, and Tdt is the average tax function. In the public
sector, workers also contribute 2% towards future retirement benefits. All agents
are risk-neutral. If they work they receive a wage payment and potentially a non-
pecuniary value Ul of working in the public sector. The net present value of the
pension benefits are B(O, t, d), and this function allows for taxation, mortality and
the details of the benefit systems (outlined in Appendix A). If they go to school
there is a cost (in money-terms) of -U3 and possibly an extra cost U3r of returning
to school from a working or a household production state." Productivity in home
production is U4t, this also increases at the rate of technological progress.
Wages are functions of experience, current skills and a conditional wage dis-
tribution with discrete support,
The skill-price is determined outside of the model, but there is (potentially)
secular growth in labour productivity. The stochastic element e is distributed on
a discrete support with a known covariance-matrix. Note that whereas education
produces skills with some probability, education is not in itself a determinant of
wages. There is also a technologically neutral growth ~ in labour productivity.
Any attempt at modelling the value of retirement will be flawed by an inaccur-
ate modelling of the intricate nature of both the legal code and of the description
of a state necessary. In this paper I model the total gross flow of benefits as the
maximum of the potential National Insurance, bIJ/ and the public sector benefits,
b~~v,and define
(4)
The net benefits are
Home production and retirement can be combined if t < T, and the tax-system
favours old-age pensioners in several ways that are partially off-setting. The net
effect of this does not vary much with income (Rønningen and Fredriksen 2002)
and can hence be modelled by a constant b~r. If the individual is eligible for
4The function B( 'IjJ) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if'IjJ is true and Ootherwise.
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retirement, he gets the tax-reduction and benefits net of taxes.
The yearly National Insurance component of retirement benefits for a single
male is approximated by
(6)
The public sector component is approximated by
gov _ {0.67. min{xlt/30, I}. min{wrt, 12Gt} if retirement from public sector
bdt -
0.67· min{xlt/40, I}· min{wlt, 12Gt}, else,
(7)
where WI is the wage at the time of retirement, Xl is the experience in the public
sector and WI is the last recorded wage. Since WI is not kept track of separately
in the state-space, I use the current state to predict what the last public sector
wage would have been. I will make the restriction on choices that no inter-sectoral
career changes can be made after the age of 60 I therefore predict public sector
wages of those not retiring from the public sector back to the this age netting
out the effect of technological progress.
Everyone is eligible for retirement when they reach 67. Everyone working in
the public sector are eligible for early retirement, "AFP" when they reach 62. In
the private sector, only about 50% of the firms are covered by the programma."
Without modelling firm-to-firm transitions in the private sector, only a crude
approximation to private sector eligibility can be made. At the age of 60, I
randomly let 50% of the private sector employment be eligible for the AFP. The
AFP programme itself I approximate by an earlier possible retirement age, but
keep the rest of the regulations from the ordinary retirement. See Hernæs et al.
(2000) for a more focused analysis of the AFP programme.
Having defined the flow from retirement, the net present value at a given
moment in time t, discounted by a discount factor 8 and the net survival prob-
abilities, with mj representing the mortality rate, can then be written
95
B(()t, t, d) =L8(i-t)bdi(()t) II (1 - mj)' (8)
i=t j=t
5The exact number is disputed (Midtsundstad 2004).
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The choice of terminal age at 95 is not important.
2.3 value of choices
The total value of an outcome is affected by the state one is at and the choice one
makes, but for expositional clarity it is convenient to introduce pm(Bt_I, at-I, t, d)
which is the probability with which the government will enrol an individual in the
national service in period t. This could potentially depend, on lagged outcomes,
such that individuals can control the draft to some extent." If the National
Service is forced on individuals, their possible next-period states are B' E M(B).
The transition to a new state is governed by the Markov transition probabilities
P(B/la, B, t, d). This depends on age, which determines eligibility for national
service, and calendar time which reflects changes in the retirement benefit system
- but also the effects of increasing wages on the probability of a transition on
the final pension points score. In my application, and for computational reasons,
I will only update the transition matrix every fifth year. I restrict the National
Service to be equivalent to the possible home-production states, M(B) = 8(4, B).
There is then an expected value v(a, B) associated with every choice,
( ) ( ) ( )[ m( B ) "P(B
/14,B,t,d) (B')
Vt a, B = U a, B + J 1 - ni, p a, ,t + 1,d Z:: P(M(B)) vt+I
IJ'EM(IJ)
+ (1 - pm(a, B, t + 1, d)) L P(B/la, B, t, d)Vt+I (B')]. (9)
lJ'ES(cx,lJ)
The state is fully observed before the choice is made, so the value function vt is
the maximum of the values of the possible actions,
Vt(B) = max vt(a, B).
CXEA(IJ,t)
(10)
The current action determines the set 8(a, B) of reachable next-period states. If
the current action was to retire or the individual reaches mandatory retirement
age, t = T, this set is empty and the career ends.
6This is similar to how Lee (2005) models the accumulation of children. I am, however, not
letting choices affect the probability of being drafted since we will find in the next section that
the average transition probabilities does not reflect the selection mechanism most people would
expect.
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We must allow for some smoothing of the choice probabilities, or there would
be a degenerate choice distribution for every (). This would a lead to a non-
smooth objective function in the estimation procedure. Following Ferrall (2002),
I therefore impose a p smoothing of choices, with p E [0,1),
Vt(a, ()) = B(a E A(())) exp (-p-(Vt(a, ()) - V't(()))) , (11)
l-p
and let individuals have exponentially smoothed choice probabilities
P (() d)
= Vt(a,())
"" , t, '\' _ ( / ()).
L..,,""'EA(8,t)Vt a ,
(12)
The extreme case of p = Ois the "perfect smoothing" case with all choices being
given equal probability. As p approaches 1 the choices approach the degenerate
case with arg max, v( a, ()) being chosen with probability one. The value of p
is estimated. In practice, and with regard to predicted choice probabilities, this
method is not much different from following the tradition of adding extreme-value
added terms to each choice."
Having solved the backward induction for P",,((), t, d) given P(()/I(), a, t, d), one
can solve forward for the full distribution of states at any time, let /-l((), t, d) be
the probability mass of generation d in state () at age t,
( ) ""'''"'{[ m( / )B(()EM(()/)) (I / )/-l (),t,g =7'~ p a,(),t,d P(M(()')) P()4,(),t-l,d
+ (1 - pm( a, e', t, d})P( ela, 8', t, d)lp.w, t - 1,d)~( e', t - 1, d) }. (13)
With the assumption that individuals start after leaving middle school without
skills and experience, this defines a full distribution of states that can be compared
with data. I will return to the empirical application in Section 4.
7Although it can be argued that the method I employ have advantages in situations where
the size of the choice set changes over the life-cycle.
82
2.4 Computational restrictions on choices
For computational reasons, I restrict the possible choice of attending school to
the first 25 years after leaving middle-school. In order to fit the pension system,
I will not let anyone retire (in the sense of claiming the National Insurance and
the supplementary benefits) before they are 62 years old. There are few people
changing their career from the private sector back to the public sector in the
last years of their career, although it might seem as if this would be favourable
for those with previous experience in the public sector. Undoubtedly there are
problems with switching career the year before retirement that will be difficult
to capture in this model, so I will not allow anyone to switch sectors after the
age of 60.
3 Data and ancillary models
Statistics Norway has collected data from various government administrative re-
cords, from which the labour economics group at Norwegian School of Econom-
ics and Business Administration has constructed an integrated database (Møen,
Salvanes and Sørensen 2003). The entire population of residents in Norway aged
16-74 can be followed with yearly observations in the years 1986-2000. In addi-
tion, a full panel of yearly labour earnings since the introduction of the National
Insurance scheme in 1967. Labour earnings is measured using the National In-
surance definition, which includes benefits while sick but excludes unemployment
benefits.
For the purpose of this paper, since there is no immigration or emigration in
the model, I restrict attention to those born in Norway (or resident at the age of 16
when the choice-model begins). I use three cohorts for estimation, the 1941, 1955
and the 1970 cohort. The 1970 cohort is a natural choice since these people leave
compulsory schooling in the first year from which we have data. The 1955 cohort
is chosen to have a middle-aged group, and the 1941 cohort since this generation
can accumulate exactly 10 years of experience before the introduction of the
National Insurance scheme. The model assumes an educational environment
that is constant. This is an abstraction, an educational reform in the 1960's
meant that compulsory education for the 1941 cohort in fact ended earlier, and
that not everyone stayed on in school until they were 16 (Raaum, Salvanes and
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Sørensen 2003). Considering the time in between schooling and observation, I
assume this to have only minor impact on the estimates. The population in the
oldest cohort is, at the time of our observations, 20498 persons, while the 1955
and 1970 cohorts consists of 30670 and 32422 respectively.
The attachment of workers to firms is observed at a point in time, from 1986
to 1994 this is May 31st, from 1995 and onward this observation is made in
November. For each of these attachments we get to observe the start-date of
employment and, if applicable, the termination date. So for choices, the calendar
year is not the only possible choice of yearly time-period. For any study that
includes education it is more convenient to measure the year according to the
academic year. I have defined the choice period of a year as beginning July 1.
Any model of career choices will come up against the problem that in the
data we see people combining several different choices within the defined time
period. People may take on a part-time job while still in school, some people
may quit school in the middle of the year to start work, some drop out without
any evident cause, and others take on a succession of high-frequency jobs. Any
rule that attempts to force data into year-long decision periods and exclusionary
choices will be arbitrary to some extent. I follow Keane and Wolpin (1997) and
Lee (2005) in hierarchically classifying the individual into categories, starting
with education, followingwith the two working choices and at last let the home-
production category be defined residually.
3.1 Defining choices from data
Education For education, we get to observe the highest education level achieved
by individuals, and the graduation date of this level. From 1986 and onward, we
also get to observe the flow of education from administrative records; whether
an individual was enrolled in part-time or full-time education as of November 1st
(Vassenden 1995; Statistisk sentralbyrå 2001). I use the "enrolled in full-time
education" to classify the individual as enrolled in school. Possibly this could
be refined by checking to see that the individual actually graduates, but this
is complicated by the fact that some educational categories span several years,
and a not insignificant fraction of the students seem to move laterally in the
grade system in a way that is not captured well by the stock variable of "highest
level achieved". Education is measured as the number of years above mandatory
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Figure 1: Choice distributions. Classifications are defined in the text. Three co-
horts, the 1941, then 1955 and the 1970 cohorts are shown, with choices recorded
in the window 1986-2000.
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education, and is capped at 9 years.
Work As mentioned, we observe if the individual is attached to an estab-
lishment once a year. We also get to observe ownership-structure, industry, a
categorical measure of weekly hours, and start and stop dates.f Using this his-
tory of work-spells, I calculate the hours worked in the year as defined from July
1 to June 30 the following year using the Labour Force Survey as guide to how
many hours per week to impute within the categorical groups, and I use only the
job spells of 20 or more hours per week." Since we only have yearly snapshots
of workplace attachment, this method may not work well when there are a lot
of high-frequency job changes. I have therefore chosen a cut-off for whether an
individual is classified as working as lowas 1000 hours per year. In order to qual-
ify as "working" the individual also needs a minimum level of earnings. Since
the working / academic year spans two calendar year, I demand that in at least
one of those two calendar years the individual earned 1G (with G defined as by
the National Insurance Administration). If they in fact worked that year, this
should easily be fulfilled, but some workplaces may wrongfully keep people in
their records after short summer jobs, and if individual do not attach themselves
to other workplaces or go to school, this could cause errors in the classification.
Sectoral categorisation For those categorised as working following the
above definition, I make the categorisation into public and private sector based on
the job-spell that contributed most hours. We get to observe a unique identifier of
the establishment, and this identifier can be used to link to the central register of
establishments and corporations (Olsen 1993), in which there is a variable indic-
ating whether the establishment is owned by central or local government. When
this link works, this is the sectoral categorisation. I have only had access to the
data from the central register of establishments and corporations for the period
1986-1995. For the remaining years 1996-2000, I have used the public/private
categorisation as available in 1995 for all those establishments that existed then.
For new establishments, I have used the 1995 data to create a mapping from in-
dustry code (ISle Rev2 at the 4-digit level) to sector (using the within industry
mode of the "public" indicator, weighting with the number of employees) and
8Weekly hours is categorised in 3 levels, (1) less than 20 hours per week, (2) between 20 and
30 hours and (3) more than 30 hours per week.
91 have calculated averages of total hours for men over the period 88-95, these averages are
12.59, 25.65 and 36.84 hours per week.
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used this industry-based categorisation on the new establishments 1996 to 2000.
For the years 1999 and 2000 a new mapping from the ISle to the NAeE industry
code is needed, I use the within NAeE mode of the ISle codes, again weighted
by the number of employees and at the 4-digit level.
Residual home production and National Service Those not categorised
under the above rules are classified as at home, an observational group that also
includes the (observationally equivalent) individuals in the National Service.
The final distributions of choices as people get older for the 3 cohorts used in
estimation is shown in Figure 1. As we can see, there is slow but steady growth in
public sector employment as people get older, whereas private sector employment
peaks around the age of 30, and then slowly tapers off as people get older. There
are few people in education after the age of 30, and we see that the slow decline
in private sector employment is (nearly) matched by a slow growth of people in
home production. The early spike in home production reflects that this category
also contain those in National Service.
In Figure 2 we see the average conditional choice probabilities by age. There
is, of course, a lot of noise in the transition probalities from the choices fewmake.
We can, however, see that there is a quite a lot of persistence in choices and that
there is more mobility among the young than among the old.
3.2 Wages and earnings
Because I define the decision year as starting at the beginning of the third quarter,
calculating wages is difficult, since the data I have to work with is yearly earn-
ings, reported for the calendar year. However, since I do not attempt to match
individual level data, I will not have to match individual decisions to individual
choices. It is therefore possible to take same liberties when calculating wages. I
have in fact chosen to offset the measurement of wages by half a year, such that
the calendar years wages corresponds to the decision period that starts in the
third quarter of that year. Since the square of wages is used when matching the
model to the data, measurement error in wages/earnings will have consequences
for identification. I have therefore chosen to only use the earnings of full-time
workers who can be matched to a workplace for at least 320 days of the relev-
ant calendar year. I have then taken the means of the labour earnings at 1998
consumer prices as the measure of that period's full-time return to labour. All
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Figure 3: Annual earnings in units of 100 000 1998 kroner. The solid line is the
public sector.
money measures throughout the paper are calculated in terms of 1998 NOK.
The figures 3-5 shows the earnings/education profiles in both the public and
the private sector for the years the model is estimated on. As we can see, among
the older cohorts, there is a substantial gap between private and public sector
wages, and a clear positive earnings profile with respect to education. In the
younger 1970 cohort, we see neither as clearly. It seems as if experience can
partiallyoffset education in the first years of the career, and that the public
sector has a flatter experience profile than the private sector.
Since the private sector supplementary pension benefits are transferrable, and
the variation in types of private supplementary benefits is too large to take into
account, I impute pension premiums to current wages in the private sector. I use
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the coverage rates from Pedersen (2000) and the rates I have shown in Figure 10.
3.3 National Service
In Norway most young males serve a year of military services. This is different
from the military career-choice modelled by Keane and Wolpin (1997) in that
it results from a mandatory military service for all young males. In principle,
everyone is called to serve for a year at age 19, but in fact there are a number
of exceptions. First, not all are in fact called to serve, some are turned away
because of weak health or because the full cohort is not needed. Second, it is
possible to postpone military service if it would interfere with studies, and third;
one can refuse military service as a conscientious objector, in which case there is
mandatory civilian service.
The military service is also only partly documented in the data available to us
(being only observable from 1993 and onward). This makes difficult to model the
early career choices of young men, since military service will potentially corrupt
the first 5 or 6 years of young men's career histories.
These fact that military service is only partially controlled by individuals also
make it difficult to model the interruption to young men's careers as either com-
pletely exogenous or freely chosen by individuals. An intermediate solution, in
which eligible young men who find themselves called to serve with probability
P~(O:t-l) is possible, by letting the National Service arrive at a rate that depends
on the choice in the previous period it would be possible to avoid military ser-
vice by staying in school hoping that one will not be called up. From Table 2 it
is evident that it attending school is not a safeguard against being drafted. In
fact, draft-probabilities are higher among those who attended school the previous
period than among those who worked or stayed home, a somewhat surprising res-
ult. A full understanding of this will probably require a more detailed modelling
of the selection into National Service, a task the model in this paper is not fit
for. As a first approximation, I let the probability of being drafted depend only
on age and cohort.
Since individuallevel information on National Service is only available from
1993 and onward, most of those serving will wrongly be classified as engaged in
home production. In order to extend the information available, I have collected
aggregate historical information from the National Draft Board about how many
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Table 2: Probability of being drafted for National Service, Pum,t
year Choice in previous period
work school home total
1993 0.0520 0.0204 0.0564 0.0239
1994 0.1751 0.2476 0.1637 0.2351
1995 0.2770 0.2992 0.2899 0.2978 I
1996 0.1633 0.2347 0.1602 0.1993
1997 0.0609 0.1520 0.0628 0.0960
1998 0.0440 0.1234 0.0468 0.0560
1999 0.0104 0.0356 0.0154 0.0016
Note: Calculated on the 1975 cohort. Draft is defined as the first entry into the military or the
social service that lasts more than 100 days.
of a given cohort they have in fact trained. I then propose a multiplicative model
of draft intensity, where
m i m
Pdt = <"d. P1975,t· (14)
The empirical hazard rate for the 1975 cohort is available in Table 2, and I then
scale these hazard rates by a cohort-specific intensity (d that is calibrated so that
the process fits the aggregate proportion of a cohort that has been trained.'?
The draft into the National Service is mostly in the beginning of every quarter.
The third quarter has the largest numbers of draftees, so that for most, conscrip-
tion is more or less synchronised with the academic year. Since most draftees
spend about 9 months in the service, I want to classify them as drafted the de-
cision year they spend to the largest extent in the National Service, so I categorise
those who enter between April l this year and March 31 the following year to be
in the National Service in the decision year that starts July 1 that year. In order
to define the entry date, I look at the first spell that lasts more than 100 days.l!
lONumbers on cohort specific training data have been provided by the National Draft Board
("Vernepliktsverket" ).
11After first joining smaller sub-spells with less than a month in between them, as these are
mostly transfers from one army base to another.
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3.4 Taxes
Since individuals aim to maximise the present value of earnings and utility flows
net of taxes, I need the tax-functions Tdt for the years 1956-2040. I have construc-
ted the income tax-functions for the case of an individually assessed individual
with no wealth or capital income for the years 1956-2000. My income-tax meas-
ure includes local and central government taxation, temporary income taxes and
reliefs and National Insurance premiums.P These functions turn out to be so
complex and non-smooth that they cannot be used directly in estimation. In-
stead I have fitted fourth-degree polynomials to the average tax-rate, using the
distribution of yearly earnings of those 40 years old as weights. Since I do not
have annual earnings for the 1956-1966 years, I have scaled the 1967 earnings
back using the index of manufacturing wages (table 10.3, Statistisk sentralbyrå
1995). This sequence of polynomials fit within sample fairly well. Out of sample,
particularly for high earnings, these polynomials do not fit well. I therefore use
the distribution of earnings to calculate the 90th percentile, above which I restrict
the average tax function to be flat.
Since the choices of young individuals in the 1986-2000 period depend on their
projections about future taxation, any choice about how to calculate future taxes
is open to debate. I have chosen to use the polynomial that approximates the 2000
tax function on the 2000 distribution of earnings. In an attempt to construct the
future taxes that keeps the current rate of redistribution more or less constant, I
scale the parameters from this polynomial while estimating, using the estimated
rate of labour-augmenting technical progress to stretch the tax function.
Pension benefits are treated favourably by the tax system: a lower rate is
used to calculate National Insurance premiums, there is a special allowance for
old age and there are rules limiting the total taxes of pensioners. These rules
partiallyoffset each other, and Rønningen and Fredriksen (2002) show that the
total effect lies in a fairly narrow band, it varies from 9900 to 15700 (both in
NOK98) in 1995 (Table 4 Rønningen and Fredriksen 2002). I use the midpoint
of this, NOK 12800, as an estimate of the net tax benefit of retirement in 1995,
and adjust this value at the same rate as the basic pension unit - at the rate of
technological progress estimated.
121 have drawn on Statistisk sentralbyrå (1958, 1968, 1975, 1988, 1994) and current numbers
from http://www.odin.dep.no/.
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3.5 Accumulated average of past pension points
I use the actual distribution of final pension points of those aged 60-70 years
old in 2000 to calculate a 4-point grid on the final pension points, at the 12.5%,
37.5%, 62.5% and 88.5% percentiles, (3.03, 4.44, 5.50, 7.06). See Figure 6 for the
full distribution of the final pension point score. Note that the 37.5th percentile
is just enough to reach above the minumum pension for a single man (for which
4.26G in accumulated average is needed). It is then straightforward to classify
individuals as being in the corresponding intervals defined by the 0-25%, 25%-
50%, 50%-75% or 75%-100% percentiles (with cut-offs (3.90, 4.96, 6.18). For
this truncation of the average accumulated pension points, I estimate reduced
form logit-equations of the probability of jumping up or down on this grid, with
the current pension points (a function of earnings, see discussion in Section A.l)
affecting the probability of switching up or down. This way, the effect of current
earnings on accumulated average pension points is smooth and continuous.
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Figure 6: Final pension point score of potential retirees (60-70 years old in 2000)
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Table 3: Average empirical transition rates on the pension capital grid grouped
byexperience. Calculated on the 1940, 1955 and 1970 cohorts.
f
PPt+l
0-9 yrs of experience 10-19 yrs of experience
pp{ 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.972 0.027 0.000 0.000 1 0.951 0.049 0.000 0.000
2 0.061 0.840 0.092 0.000 2 0.013 0.930 0.056 0.000
3 0.005 0.070 0.851 0.075 3 0.000 0.015 0.952 0.034
4 0.002 0.006 0.072 0.920 4 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.984
20-29 yrs of experience 30+ yrs of experience
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 0.912 0.084 0.000 0.000 1 0.968 0.032 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.916 0.084 0.000 2 0.000 0.979 0.021 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.945 0.055 3 0.000 0.000 0.992 0.008
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Whereas one would not need more than a two-point discretisation of the
accumulated pension points to capture the main incentives, a finer grid is needed
in order to robustly estimate the reduced form process on the grid. Separate
regressions are made for each experience category, with experience calculated as
number of years with earnings of at least one G (this corresponds to National
Insurance practise). The average transition rates by experience group is shown
in Table 3. We see that from year to year, there is not excessive volatility on
this grid. In Table 4 are the estimated logit-equations where the probability of a
jump up (or down) on the grid is estimated as a function of current earnings (in
pension points), with different parameters by experience group. These estimates
are then applied as parameters in the structural model.
4 Estimation
In order to facilitate estimation, I introduce some further notation. Remembering
that D is an index set of observable (demographical) groups, one such group
could be all males born in cohort 1970. Within each of these observable groups,
let k E {1, ... ,K} index a set of unobservable types in the sense of Heckman
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Table 4: Reduced form (Logit) estimates of final pension points process on the
4-point grid. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimated on data from the 1940,
1955 and 1975 cohorts.
0-9 years of experience
Pension capital (t - 1) 1 2 3 4
jump up/down up down up down up down
pension points 1.62 -1.31 1.97
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
-11.98 3.70 -15.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.15)
-1.28 1.94
(0.02) (0.04)
4.93 -16.58
(0.11) (0.30)
-1.21
(0.03)
5.65
(0.19)
constant
10-19 years of experience
Pension capital (t - 1) 1 2 3 4
jump up/down up down up down up down
pension points 1.31 -0.05 1.54 -0.75 2.00 -0.63
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
-10.51 -0.11 -13.26 0.19 -18.29 0.06
(0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.31) (0.09)
constant
20-29 years of experience
Pension capital (t - 1) 1 2 3 4
jump up/down up up up
pension points 1.21 1.23 1.37
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
constant -8.25 -9.43 -11.72
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13)
30+ years of experience
Pension capital (t - 1) 1 2 3 4
jump up/down up up up
pension points 2.45 2.76 3.02
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
constant -14.50 -18.03 -22.43
(0.68) (0.63) (0.90)
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and Singer (1984). Each of these K are associated with a weight Adk E [0,1]
(such that I:k Adk = 1) and a type-specific parameter-vector 'Yk, the structural
parameters. Now the data will be composed of DK types each solving their own
problem as defined in the model described in Section 2, and from now on I will
on occasion subscript the terms defined earlier by their dk group.
4.1 Measurements and moments
The distribution J.L in equation (13) is defined as the distribution of individuals
of individuals over the state space e. In itself, this is not useful for estimation
since there are several unobservable components of this space. Let us therefore
determine a measurement function y : e x A -+ Y, where Y is a space of
measurements: yearly earnings, schooling, pension capital and choices in the
previous period. Note that there are also endogenous state-variable that are
not measured, such as sector-specific experience (for the older generations) and
sector-specific skills, and choices can also be obscured by forced National Service.
In the terminology of Ferrall (2002), the social environment is not transparent.
The distribution over states induced by the optimal choices defines a dis-
tribution function F(J.L) : Y -+ [0,1] on the measurements. With this distri-
bution F it is easy to define a series of observable moments predicted by the
model, this distribution Fd(T, Ag) will depend on all the type-specific paramet-
ers (T = ('YI, ... , 'YK )) and the population shares of the types in the d group
(Ad = (Adl,"" AdK))' It is now straight-forward to define a moment-generating
function b. : r -+ ]RQ, with Q being the number of moments.
The empirical moments I match are outlined in Table 5. This list is a variation
of those used by Lee (2005), but with more conditional choice probabilities than
Lee was able to calculate from his data. The reason for choosing to fit the
mean and the mean squared wages instead of the mean and the variance such as
Lee does, is that only one pass through the states is necessary. This makes an
difference for computational efficiency since the problem for each of the K types
can be calculated separately by parallel processors, and fewer numbers need to
be passed along. In order to calculate the variance of wages one would need
to pass the full distribution across states for all types. This reduction in the
information that has to be passed between processes reduces the time needed
for communication on inexpensive clusters with distributed and limited memory,
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and makes it possible to apply the efficient methods for finite mixture models
developed by Ferrall (2005).
The model is estimated with GMM, with the objective function
L [((.&d - W{[=l (L1d(rk),Ak)))' ild ((.:id - W{[=l (L1d(rk),Ak)))] . (15)
dED
TheW operator aggregates the moments from the K unobserved types using the
Ak weights and ancillary information about conditional masses. The standard
formula for the variance of the estimates, is now
where J is the Jacobian of the moment vector with respect to the parameter
vector.
Since the number of moments used is large I do not attempt an optimal
weighting matrix. For computational tractability I follow use a diagonal weight-
ing matrix outlined in Table 5. The estimation, like that of Lee (2005) and
Lee and Wolpin (2004), is not fully standard in that conditional moments are
matched (such as sector and education-level specific wages)P This means that
the full covariance matrix of L1 is not defined. As a practical approximation I
use only a diagonal estimate of var(.:i), calculated with the size of the relevant
sub-populations.
4.2 Estimated parameters
Estimation was performed on the 5-node cluster "paulus" at Norwegian School
of Economics and Business Administration using the FmOpt library (Ferrall
2005).14 Tables 6, 7 and 8 contain the estimates of the structural parameters
where only base levels and the sector specific skills are allowed to differ by type.
The discount factor is fixed at 0.98, the same level as in Rust and Phelan (1997).
This value is higher than that fixed by van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005) who fix
it at 0.95, but lower than the rates estimated by French (2005), who find 0.985-
13There is a brief discussion about this in footnote 21 of Lee (2005) related to Lee's weighting
strategy, but no information is provided about the calculation of standard errors.
14Running on 9 processors, estimation took about a week, with a sequence of simplex and
gradient-based methods.
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1.04. State-dependent transition probabilities for the value of home production
turned out to be hard to identify, I have restricted the value of home production
to be constant.
The two types are distinctly different. Type 1 has a fairly flat earnings-profile
with small returns to experience and small levels of sector specific skills. Type
two starts with a much lower base level of skills, but has the possibility of gaining
large amounts of sector specific skills - these almost triples the skill-level. These
large difference between the types, together with the fact that the type-shares
for the 1941 cohort is very different from those of the 1955 and 1970 cohort may
indicate that there is in fact room for more heterogeneity in the model, and that
I should attempt to estimate model with three types.
The probability of gaining the sector specific skills are slightly lower in school
(at 0.059, an expected length to gain skills of 17 years) than at work (at 0.066,
or an expected length to gain skills of 15 years). But this difference is not large,
and those who gain skills at school accumulate "general skills" , in the sense that
they are free to choose what sector to apply them to, whereas the skills gained
at work are sector specific. There is quite a high probability of losing skills that
are not used (at 0.42, or an expected length to loss of skills of 2.4 years). This
creates a significant skill-based lock-in for type 2 individuals who have reached
the high-skill level.
Most of the parameters that are not close to being so small as to have no
economic impact on choices are estimated at a moderately comfortable level of
precision. We should not be surprised that parameters that estimated to have
little or no effect on choices or observed earnings (such as the correlation between
the shock to public and private sector wages) are imprecisely estimated.
5 Policy experiment
The "Johnsen-commission", with a mandate to examine the National Insurance
scheme has suggested several changes to the current scheme, to be implemented
from 2010, starting with the 1951 cohort. Many of the suggested changes are
much to fine-grained to be captured well by the stylised model in this paper,
but some of the larger feature can be captured here: The commission proposes
to abolish the 20-best-years averaging of the accumulated pension points, and a
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Table 6: Structural estimates, common parameters
parameter value
smoothing factor, p 8.24e-6
(0.67e-6)
discount factor, 8 0.98
(fixed)
technological progress, ~ 13.91e-3
( 1.14e-3)
utility of school, U3 160e3
(15e3)
cost of returning to school, U3r 115e3
(30e3)
prob. of losing non-used skill 0.416
(0.068)
prob. of gaining skill by work 0.066
(0.017)
prob. of gaining skill at school 0.059
(0.011)
base productivity in home production 148e3
(ge3)
Table 7: Structural estimates, type shares
Demographic group Share of type 1
1941 cohort
1955 cohort
0.698
(0.046)
0.341
(0.047)
0.279
(0.053)
1970 cohort
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Table 8: Structural estimates, public and private sector skill equation
own experience squared
public sector private sector
type 1 type 2 type 1 type 2
125e3 83.7e3 115e3 75.3e3
(9.3e3) (8.1e3) (13.2e3) (12.ge3)
0.032 0.958 0.184 1.088
(0.685) (1.267) (0.089) (0.176)
L 73e-3 16.0e-3
(2.40e-3) (3.24e-3)
-0.lOe-3 -0.40e-3
(0.04e-3) (0.lle-3)
L72e-3 0.10e-3
(1.96e-3) (1.7e-3)
0.269 0.019
(0.046) (0.820)
parameter
constant
sector-specific skill
own experience
experience in other sector
0.860
(31.9)
replacement by a flat function of past income. It also proposes to replace the
early retirement scheme (AFP) with a flexible choice of retirement age, where
individuals are less favourably compensated when they retire early. One would
think it would be of value to know to what extent this would affect retirement de-
cisions. The analysis in Norges offentlige utredninger (2004) is based on analysis
using "MOSART" (Fredriksen 1998). It is based on the assumption that future
choices under the new system is a simple average of current conditional choices
and the choice from before the introduction of AFP.15 As of today, the agree-
ment between the political parties (Arnstad, Nilsen, Steensnes, Stoltenberg and
Vihovde 2005) does not indicate an abolishment of AFP (although adjustments
may be made).
The details of the agreement among the political parties is hard to interpret
in terms of the primitives of my model, e.g. it includes a lower rate of index-
ation, in which the average of wage growth and inflation is used for adjusting
the value of benefits, and I have not attempted to model a change in the life
expectancy as forecasted by the public commissions. As a first approximation,
15Personal communication with Dennis Fredriksen, Statistics Norway.
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I model only a simple "core" reform. I model the removal of the "twenty-best-
years" rule, and I adjust the National Insurance down slightly. I re-estimate
Pppf (pp! (et+1)!at, WOt (et), pp/ (fh), t, d), the transition function for the final pen-
sion point score. I use the same cut-offs as earlier, but with a flat average of past
pension points instead of the "twenty-best-years" rule (allowing for more "down"
movements on the fixed pension point grid). I also reduce the National Insurance
benefits by a modest 5%. In Figure 7 one can see the effect of this on the out-of
sample predictions for the 1970 birth cohort.
First, we can note that the overall employment levels seem rather low. How-
ever, we can note that the model does not allow for part-time workers (who are
classified as primarily doing home production). The jaggedness of the labour sup-
ply profile is an artifact of the Markov transition matrix only being updated every
fifth year. The overall pattern under the baseline is in line with the historical
experience: A more or less flat participation in the public sector, with a decrease
in the private sector over time. This decrease in the private sector is reasonable
since there are weaker pension capital benefits in the private sector. There is,
however, a peculiar influx into the public sector at the end of the lifecycle: These
are people who are transferring to the public sector to be guaranteed AFP - early
retirement benefits in the last year such a transfer is possible (by a restriction in
the model). Since I have no firms in the model, I let private sector workers face a
gamble on whether they could take AFP retirement, and it seems as if the value
of AFP is to great for people to take that risk. This is not in itself alarming,
since a number of other papers have shown that there are extremely strong in-
centives for people to take up the AFP if possible, and people who put any value
on leisure will be predicted to retire early unless there are outside restrictions on
the possibility of gaining a AFP-qualifying job.
The effect of the policy experiment is to reduce the labour supply of the
middle aged group. Because of the relatively high rate of technological progress
estimated, the retirement benefits seem to have early effects on labour supply.
This is in line with what Rust (2001) has found. In my model it might be further
suppressed by the fact that people realise that the most likely retirement option
is with AFP from the public sector, and hence weights life-cycle contributions
less. The policy experiment has a further effect at the end of the lifecycle. There
is a marked increase in labour supply in the private sector among people in their
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mid-sixties. These people are the ones who did not win out in the AFP gamble
- either they stayed on in the private sector, or they did not get the high public-
sector wage draw they had hoped for, and which would have made them retire
early with a high level of benefits.
6 Conluding remarks
I have estimated a basic two-sector life-cycle labour supply model with only two
inital types of workers. However, as time goes on and individuals make different
choices, a large amount of ex-post heterogeneity is created. The estimates indic-
ate that there is a type of worker for which comparative advantage is generated
by their accumulated life-history, and for which the endogenous costs of switching
sectors can be large. The model extends the human capitalliterature that takes
education as a deterministic determinant of wages into a more realistic environ-
ment where education is one of the factors (together with work experience) that
goes into producing skills that are valued by workplaces - without guaranteeing
a monetary payoff of education.
The policy experiment emphasises the fact that the labour supply effects of a
National Insurance reform cannot be analysed entirely independent of the benefits
in the public sector, and that the early retirement interacting with public sector
benefits can have large effects on incentives. We cannot, of course, expect to see
the extreme influx of workers to the public sector predicted by the model in real
life: The model supports the conclusion of earlier studies that the incentives to
retire using the AFP scheme are strong, and the fact that people do continue
to work after qualifying for early retirement is hard to reconcile with a positive
value on home production.
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Figure 7: Policy experiment. A removal of the "twenty-best-years" rule and
a 5% reduction in National Insurance benefits. The "baseline" is the current
policy, under which the model is estimated.
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Figure 8: Share of workers covered by supplementary pension plans.
Public sector at bottom, private sector in the middle and no coverage on top.
The figure is taken from Pedersen (2000) and is based on Labour Force Survey
data (AKU).
Appendix A Institutional setting: The Norwe-
gian pension benefits
In this section I describe the Norwegian pension benefits at a level of some excess
detail, to make it possible to evaluate the representativeness of the incentives
that are embedded in my empirical model.
There are many different private sector schemes. The great majority are also
of the defined benefit type, but employers typically pay one of the large insurance
houses to provide actuarial annuities, and firms contribute based on the charac-
teristics of individual workers. These terms are much like what individuals can
obtain in individual retirement savings schemes. If a worker leaves a firm before
retirement, the insurance firm providing the retirement issues a bond guaran-
teeing an annuity at retirement corresponding to the contributions of employers.
Not everyone are covered by the private sector supplementary pension schemes,
but if a corporation choose to provide a pension scheme, it must do so to all
employees in order to expense contributions before taxes.
107
A.l National insurance
The National Insurance pension benefits consists of a basic pension provided to
all with more than three years of residence.l" The legal retirement age is 67.
There are three elements in the National Insurance old age pension. There is the
basic pension, the special supplement and the supplementary pension.
The basic pension and the special supplement together makes up the minimum
pension, and is not dependent on past contributions to the national insurance
system, but is available to all residents. If they have lived less then 40 years
in Norway, the minimum pension is reduced accordingly. For national insurance
and public sector pension benefits, all earnings (no capital income, no pension
benefits) are calculated in units of basic amount ("grunnbeløp") G, the unit of
account. Inflation is corrected for by adjustments of G, sometimes several times
a year, but G is also meant to follow the average wage growth, although it has
grown slower than wages historically, and only since the last revision in 1992 of
the National Insurance in 1992 has there been any significant real growth in the
value of a basic amount.
The basic pension is 1G, except when the pensioner has a spouse who works
and earn more than 2G or when the spouse is retired, in which case the basic
pension is 0.75G for each.
For single persons or for people with non-retired spouses, the full special
supplement is 0.7933G. If the pensioner is providing for a spouse over the age of
60, the couple together gets 1.5866G. For a couple where both spouses are retired,
the supplement is also 0.7933G unless one them has a higher supplementary
pension, in which case the special supplement to the spouse is 0.74G.
The supplementary pension is based on earned incomes in the past. Earnings
from a given year is first mapped into a number of pension points. Over time,
there have been some changes in how pension points have been calculated from
earnings, and Figure 9 shows how the progressiveness has changed over time.
The yearly pension points are summarised by a final points score, pp!. This
is the average of the 20 highest yearly pension points earned. If a pensioner has
earned pension points in x < 20 years, it is the average of these x years. The
final supplementary pension in a year t is then Gt . pp! . I:j1rj/40, where the
summation j is over the working years but limited to 40 years. Work experience
before 1992 is awarded a replacement rate 1rt = 0.45, while experience from 1992
and onward is given a replacement rate 1rt = 0.42. The national insurance old age
pension is then the basic pension plus the maximum of the special supplement
and the supplementary pension.
16For a more detailed description, see The Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme 2002, http:
//www.dep.no/sos/engelsk/publ/handbooks/044051-120003/index-dokOOO-b-n-a.html.
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ocurrent pension points
as function of current earnings
__ .____________
___ ................................
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o
o 5 10
earnings (in basic amounts)
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pp(earnings,t) for 1967<=1<1971
----- pp(earnings,t) for 1971 <=t<1992
........... pp(earnings,t) for t>=1992
Figure 9: Pension points as functions of current earnings. Earnings in units
of basic amount (G). In the year 20000, one basic amount was NOK 48400,
approximately USD 7500.
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A.2 adding public sector benefits
The public sector benefits are different. The system is complex, but the main
characteristics for people who stay in the public sector is possible to explain. The
various public sector insurance funds have agreements that the fund responsible
for the individual when retirement takes place pays all benefits. For employees
of the central administration, this system also applies for mobility between the
Scandinavian countries.
There is a guaranteed benefit level of 0.66 . min(wi, l2Gt)A, where wi is the
wage at the end of the career and A E [O,1] is the share of a "full career" worked
in the public sector. For a "full career" in the public sector, only 30 years are
needed - but if a person does not retire from the public sector, the "full career"
career is calculated using between 30 and 40 years, depending on how long the
actual career could have been if the retiree had stayed on in the public sector. If
the ending wage is low in comparison with the wage over the rest of the career,
adjustments will be made. For the years before the record wage, the record wage
is applied. If a person reaches 30 years of experience at age 67, but there was a
decrease in wage from 100 to 70 at age 60, the "final wage" will be calculated as
23/30·100+ 7/30·70 = 93. But if the individual in fact has 37 years of experience
in the public sector at retirement age and the record wage of 100 occurred at the
end of a 30-year spell, the ending wage will be applied as 100.
The public sector benefits are only an addition to the national insurance, these
two benefit levels are consolidated in ways that most Norwegians find somewhat
cryptic.'? An individual is guaranteed the maximum of national insurance be-
nefits and public sector pensions, and the specifics is such that usually people
will get more than this. The pension paid by the public sector pension fund is
first reduced by 0.75 . A . Gt, corresponding vaguely to the basic pension. The
supplementary pension from the national insurance is in principle deducted by
a A factor, unless parts of it was earned in the private sector. In this case, the
part earned outside is not included in the deduction from the public sector. The
calculation of the deduction is "simplified" by using the final wage to calculate
a "fictitious" number of pension points, and the pensioner is allowed to keep an
amount (wi - GI) . yP / 40 . 7r • Gt of the national insurance benefit.
To a first approximation, the pensioner gets the maximum of his guaranteed
level from the public sector fund and what he is earned by the national insurance.
A.3 private sector benefits
Less than half of all those employed in the private sector are members of corporate
sponsored pension plans, see Figure 8 taken from Pedersen (2000). In most
cases, the firms buy these pension services from private insurance companies.
17It is regulated in Lov om samordning av pensjons- og trygdeytelser, 1957-07-06 no. 26,
http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19570706-026.html.
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While there are peculiarities with some of these programs, these programs are
not consolidated with the national insurance. If an employer leaves a firm to
work at another, the value of past pension contributions is calculated and a
special retirement bond is issued. Individuals are allowed to continue paying into
the programme on the same rate as those the corporation paid, but the next firm
the individual applies to can also take on the previous pension contributions and
respect those as if they were contributions into the new firm's programme. And
lastly, the individual can hold on to the bond as such as cash in the stream of
payments which will start at the official retirement age of 67.
Most private pension funds provide pension programmes which mimic the
public funds (a fixed proportion of final wage), but at a corporation level. Also
the guarantee is not absolute: One is in fact provided an annuity of the difference
between the fixed percentage of the final wage and the national insurance level
at the time of retirement, while the public programmes will compensate should
the national insurance benefits decline in the future. If one should leave early in
these programmes, ones future benefits are converted into a transferable promise
of an annuity, but some corporations (e.g. Storebrand) advertises that a benefit
to the corporation of these are more loyal employees. This has to do with how
contributions and benefits were calculated in the past and there have in fact
been clauses that firms can refuse to give older newly hired workers access to
the corporation's pension programme. They have had their reasons for this: The
contributions firms have made on behalf of their employees have traditionally been
non-linear and concentrated in the latest years of a worker's career. In Figure 10
I have predicted typical age-profiles of contributions using the "annuity-method"
(Clausen and Hersoug 2003).18 This method has been the most popular one,
since this method was required for tax exemption, and we see that it reaches 5%
of earnings only as people are in their fifties.
AA early retirement
There are some local forms of early retirement possible. But in later years, a
major policy innovation has been the AFP program. The "AFP" (Avtalefestet
Pensjon) was introduced as an agreement between the parties in centralised wage-
bargaining. Today, the programme allows retirement from the age of 62, but is
not extended to everyone. It is extended to all of the public sector, and to the
firms affected by private sector agreements between NHO and LO (the two main
employer and employee organisations involved in wage bargaining). When it was
introduced around 1990, it only allowed for retirement one year early, and has
then been gradually extended. The latest extension (from 64 to 62 years) was
in March 1998. Unfortunately, it not clear from our data which firms in the
18These are calculated byestimating a 4th degree polynomials of earnings on age on those
of the 1937 cohort employed in private firms in 1986, then using this polynomial to calculate
benefits.
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Figure 10: Typical private supplementary benefit premium profile
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private sector is covered by the central wage-bargaining agreement. A further
complication with this programme is that it depends on your history with the
latest firm you are attached to: you need at least 3 years with the latest firm or
5 years with firms covered by the AFP agreement.
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